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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The process of transition has resulted in the formation of new relations in
the sphere of labor demand, i.e., in wage-setting and employment be-
havior of enterprises. The usual approach to analyzing the behavior of
enterprises in this sphere is based on the comparison of the bargaining
power of managers and trade-unions and also on the identification of the
specific goals of trade-unions.
When the goal of a trade union is to guarantee adequate wages for its
members, and when the enterprise, which maximizes its profit, has com-
plete control over employment, the contract curve corresponds to the
labor demand curve (i.e., wages are equal to the marginal product of la-
bor). This is the "right to manage" model. In the other cases, the con-
tract curve1 does not correspond to the labor demand curve (i.e., wages
are not equal to the marginal product of labor). There are three models
of behavior, based on the assumption that the goal of a trade-union is
not only wage levels but also employment. The model of "efficient allo-
cation of labor" corresponds to the situation when the objective of a
trade-union is to maintain employment. The situation when wage and
employment move in the same direction corresponds to the "efficient
bargaining model." In the third situation (intermediate model), the con-
tract curve has a negative slope but the wage level is higher than the
marginal revenue product of labor (the employment level is higher than
the level that an enterprise would choose if trade-unions lost their influ-
ence). Hypothetically, one more situation is possible, the "cost of labor
turnover hypothesis", when the firm transfers the costs of turnover to the
employees and fixes the wage level lower than the marginal revenue
product of labor as a consequence of the weak bargaining power of
trade-unions. All the above-mentioned models allow for the possibility
that workers appropriate some of the enterprise-specific rents in their
wages. The structure of the bargaining process during economic transi-
tion is more complicated because government and inside owners (em-
ployees) have an impact on this process as do managers and trade-
unions.
The objectives of this research are to determine the model of enter-
prises' behavior during transition using empirical analysis and to analyze
                                               
1 The contract curve is the set of all socially efficient "deals" between employer
and employee. A "deal" is not socially efficient (it does not belong to the contract
curve) if one party's welfare can be increased without reducing the other party's
welfare.
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how this behavior varies with the change in economic system and to
identify different enterprise-specific factors such as the form of owner-
ship, the industry, trade-union activities, the domination of some groups
of owners, etc., that influence behavior.
We use panel data on large-sized and average-sized enterprises
in the Novosibirsk region. Our analysis covers a large time interval:
1992 – 1998. All estimations are done for three periods: 1992 – 1995 —
early transition; 1994 – 1996 — period of dynamic reforms; 1996 – 1998 —
postprivatization period.
The main results of our research are as follows.
We failed to determine the model of wage-setting and employment be-
havior of enterprises at the beginning of transition (1992 – 1993).
According to our analysis the "right to manage" model was formed only
by 1994.
As for such firm-specific factors as the form of ownership, the domina-
tion of one or another group of owners, the influence of trade-union or
collective contract we found that they have an influence on the behavior
of enterprises during only some periods (as a rule during early postpri-
vatization period — 1994 – 1996).
Employees systematically appropriate some of the firm-specific rents in
their wages. The domination of managers in the group of enterprise
owners is the main factor which restrains this process.
Our results have policy implications. The adjustment of enterprises to the
changes in demand becomes better over time. The growth of employ-
ment elasticity with respect to sales means that enterprises will reduce
employment more intensively in response to a fall in output. Conse-
quently conditions exist for the growth of current unemployment (natural
rate of unemployment) and state authorities must be prepared that the
unemployment level will increase.
Our analysis shows that the wage level, fixed on the base of industrial
agreements, is the guiding line for wage behavior for both unionized en-
terprises as well as non-unionized ones.
We found that workers appropriate some of the firm-specific rents in
their wages. Thus enterprises are losing internal resources for further in-
vestment. In order to restructure enterprises, the government does not
have to yield to the pressure of trade-union seeking to increase wages
while bargaining with employers and unions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The formation of employment and wage-setting behavior of enterprises
became one of the main problems in the Russian economy after eco-
nomic liberalization because wages as well as the labor force were under
government control in the centrally planned economy with soft budget
constraints. Managers of large-sized enterprises were aimed at the
growth of employment and, as a consequence, wage fund maximization
because this raised their status in the managers' hierarchy during so-
cialism. Local government authorities were also interested in job growth
because their status was also determined by the size and the number of
enterprises located in their region. And finally, unions, in spite of their
formal and limited rights in the planned economy, were also interested in
the growth in the number of employees regardless of the financial results
of enterprise because the amount of social benefits for employees de-
pended on the size of an enterprise. Thus a tripartite consensus was
formed during the time of the planned economy: employment had to rise
and wages must also increase, providing the necessary labor force for
enterprises under the condition of a labor force deficit.
The only opponent to the interests of the above-mentioned groups
(managers, unions, local authorities) in the planned economy was the
government which was faced with hard budget constraints at the macro-
economic level and tried to transfer these constraints to the enterprise
(microeconomic) level. This situation looks opposite to the one sug-
gested by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) because in the planned economy
politicians (government) were aimed at labor force containment while
managers were trying to increase the number of employees.
Employment and wage-setting enterprise behavior during transition, es-
pecially after mass privatization and toughening of budget constraints, is
the result of the bargaining process between several groups (partners):
1) employers; 2) employees; 3) inside owners (employees); 4) outside
owners; 5) government. These interests are combined in different ways
depending on the variant of privatization. At the same time, some enter-
prises have no freedom to decide whether to go private or not and what
variant of privatization to choose.
The structure of interests in transition is a great problem also because
the interests of employees are represented not only by unions but also
by those employees who are co-owners of an enterprise (insiders). Dur-
ing transition, state regulation on the enterprise level is stronger than in
the market economy no matter who the owner of an enterprise is.
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The main problem confronting researches is the analysis of enterprise
employment and wage-setting behavior and how this behavior varies with
changes in different enterprise-specific factors as well as with changes
in the economic system over time. New enterprise behavior develops
during transition when there is a recession, but employment and wages
adjust to the changes in output with some lag. The study of these ten-
dencies is useful for the formation of industrial and social (employment)
policy.
Our analysis covers a significantly large time interval — six years — and
thus captures early transition (1992 – 1995) and also the post-
privatization (1996 – 1998) changes in enterprise behavior. This allows
us to estimate qualitative changes in labor demand and also solves the
problem of lagged variables in our empirical work. We also take into ac-
count some factors typical for the Russian economy and for the Novo-
sibirsk region.
The structure of Novosibirsk region's industry is similar to that of the re-
gions of Ural and Siberia, as their labor markets are also not very mobile.
That's why the results of our research should be useful for other regions
as a preliminary estimation of firms' behavior.
During forty-five years of intensive researches in the labor demand
sphere two different approaches have been developed.
Some Russian authors (Aukutsionek, 1994, 1997; Aukutsionek and Kape-
liushnikov, 1996) use the methodology based on the analysis of system-
atic questionnaires and interviewing managers. The traditional western
approach is to analyze labor demand using the dynamic labor demand
models and bargaining models.
The first studies on the problem of dynamic labor demand were pub-
lished in the 1960s (Brown and de Cani, 1963). Since the 1970s, the
number of studies has grown (e.g., Hamermesh, 1976; Sargent, 1978).
The studies of McDonald and Solow (1981) and Nickell (1984) are
probably the most influential. The former contains a fundamentals of
analysis of the behavior of wage rates during fluctuations in output and
employment in the bargaining model. The latter contains the derivation of
the most common specifications resulting from cost minimization under
rational expectations, based on a model of a representative firm and the
corresponding econometric methodology. From the middle of the 1980s,
the number of studies estimating labor demand parameters on firm-level
panel data has grown. At the same time, as the result of analyzing union
behavior, the studies of wage levels and employment, which were based
on different types of bargaining models, were developed.
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The most interesting studies of labor demand are by Hamermesh (1986),
MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), Nickell
(1986), Machin et al. (1993), and of union behavior are by Eberts and
Stone (1986), Farber (1986),and Creedy and McDonald (1991). The for-
mer group of authors studies different modifications of criterion function
of the firm, which optimizes its behavior on the unionized labor market.
The later group focuses on the criterion function of trade unions and on
the optimization of their behavior on the labor market.
Some researchers have paid great attention to the problems of
econometric methodology and to the analysis of the advantages of dif-
ferent methods of estimation and hypothesis testing. The studies of
Svejnar (1986), Hamermesh (1989), Nickell and Wadhwani (1990),
Singer (1996) developed different procedures of econometric simulation
trying to approximate the choice of estimation method to the type of the
data used by authors.
From the beginning of the 1990s some research devoted to micro-level
labor demand analysis during transition has been done. Some research-
ers have focused on the behavior of participatory firms in Yugoslavia
(Estrin and Svejnar, 1993; Prasnikar et al., 1994). Basu et al. (1997) ac-
complished a comparative analysis of employment and wage behavior of
enterprises in some transitional countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Re-
public, Slovakia) and Singer (1996) conducted detailed research using
panel data from the Czech Republic. The analysis of wage level setting
and employment rate in a transitional economy using data from Hungary
is represented by the work of Commander et al., (1995), and an analysis
using Russian data can be found in the work of Commander et al.,
(1996). These studies have drawn some conclusions about the first pe-
riod of formation of a new type of enterprises' behavior during early
transition. But because of short time period for analysis the above-
mentioned researchers were unable to estimate the dynamics of enter-
prise behavior formation.
Our research is derived from the main ideas of the dynamic labor de-
mand model and bargaining models. It is based on the models devel-
oped by Prasnikar et al. (1994), Singer (1996); and Basu et al. (1997),
and takes into account some factors typical for the Russian economy.
This approach helps us to define the type of enterprise behavior that de-
pends on how the firm adjusts employment in response to changes in
wages. It is also allows us to make between-counties comparisons of
enterprises' behavior during transition.
The next section is devoted to the methodology of our research. We
present the model in Section 3 and describe the data in Section 4. The
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results from our work are presented in Section 5 and conclusions are
drawn in the last section.
2. METHODOLOGY
The formation of enterprise employment and wage-setting behavior is in-
fluenced by the conflict of interests of the firm (profit and revenue) and
its employees (wages and employment).Managers represent the inter-
ests of the firm, unions and other nonunion groups of workers represent
the interests of employees.
The traditional approach to the analysis of firm behavior in a market
economy suggests that unions have some monopolistic power in the la-
bor market and the firm has some market power (control over the price
of its product). This means that the firm can have some positive eco-
nomic profit. The distribution of this profit is the subject of bargaining. If
the firm does not have any market power and if wages are competitive,
any attempts to increase wages or employment will led to its bankruptcy
(see e.g., Filer et al., 1996). At once, it was supposed that interacting
groups take into account the interests of their opponents and achieve
some compromise (the point of contract); otherwise, the process of pro-
duction would be impossible. For the Russian transitional economy, this
approach needs some corrections.
First, the object of redistribution is not profit but value added. It includes
account profit generated by the firm. We also need to take into account
that under the conditions of soft budget constraints some part of the
value added may be redistributed between firms. Thus, in a transitional
economy, one firm may get some "extra money" from other enterprises.
Secondly, some employees became co-owners (inside owners) of their
enterprise after privatization, thus they gained the right to bargain
through other means than solely through unions. The weight placed on
wage and employment depends on the share of inside owners out of the
total number of employees.
If the share of insiders of the total number of employees is not great
(concentrated insider's ownership), they will be interested in increasing
wages with no emphasis on employment because their status may pro-
tect them from being discharge at the time of employment cut backs.
But if the share of insiders is great (dispersed insider's ownership), they
will stand for maintaining full employment.
Thirdly, the objectives of the other participants in the bargaining process
(not employees) must be reformulated.
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The principal goal of the manager is firm revenue maximization (which is
connected with his/her private revenue) and his/her career progression.
But the fulfillment of this objective, in turn, depends on the priorities of
the firm's owners. The income maximizing goal is in consensus with out-
side owners' interests, which gives support to managers. But when the
share of inside owners of the authorized capital stock is great, the man-
ager's goal may also be wage setting if the main source of the insiders'
income is wages and may also be employment if the number of inside
owners is significant. The intention to maintain the employment level is
also connected with some paternalistic tendencies and the status of
manager because the greater the number of employees, the greater
status the enterprise manager has.
The government's goals are employment and budget revenue. But under
conditions of social tension, government authorities will make efforts to
keep employment, placing no emphasis on profit, by using state owner-
ship rights or formal methods (legislative acts, tax allowances, etc.) as
well as informal ones (personal recommendations, verbal contracts, etc.)
Under the influence of the bargaining power of the above-mentioned
groups, different combinations of employment-wage levels correspond-
ing with different output levels become possible. It is necessary to realize
that the main bargaining groups are the employees (organized groups of
workers or trade unions) and the managers. All other participants in the
bargaining process can only realize their interests by influencing the po-
sition of direct members in the bargaining process
The point of short-run labor demand equilibrium in the competitive labor
market is taken as a starting position to classify possible types of enter-
prise behavior. At this point, wages are equal to marginal revenue of
labor product under the conditions of profit maximization (cost minimiza-
tion). The minimum acceptable level of wages and corresponding em-
ployment rate characterizes this situation.
The existence of several bargaining groups, pursuing their own goals and
obtaining different bargaining power may lead to different types of firm
behavior. These different types of behavior are as follows.
1. The first type is situation of wages increasing and employment de-
creasing under the condition of a short-run labor demand equilibrium
that corresponds to the labor demand curve. This is the right-to-manage
model (see e.g., Filer et al., 1996). Here the subject of bargaining be-
tween the firm and the union is wage levels, allowing the employer com-
plete discretion over employment.
In a transitional economy this situation may be generated by the unions'
behavior according to the "right-to-manage" model. It corresponds to
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the existing practice in which a labor contract is based on an industry
tariff agreement. As usual, an industry tariff agreement fixes the wage
level but does not require that managers keep the employment rate. An-
other reason for this behavior is concentrated inside ownership, i.e., the
low number of inside owners in the labor force. In such a case, the gov-
ernment does not have any active impact on the bargaining process.
2. Another type of behavior is a "socially efficient set of outcomes"
(contracts), corresponding to the "efficient allocation of labor" (Basu
et al., 1997) or "strongly efficient contract" (Borjas, 1996). In such a
case, the constant employment level accompanies wage increases (and
corresponding profits decrease).
Such behavior in transitional economies looks like the situation when a
lot of employees own shares of their enterprise (dispersed inside owner-
ship). At the same time, unions, government authorities (trying to prevent
unemployment) and managers (seeking owners' support) are interested
in maintaining the employment level. The unions' ability to influence the
employment level depends on the strength of the particular union, espe-
cially on its opportunities to include the point about labor level mainte-
nance in an agreement and to force managers to fulfill this point of the
contract. Technological aspects determine this type of behavior (i.e., fuel
and energy industry, chemical industry); sometimes the volume of pro-
duction may be changed without any significant changes in the number
of employees.
3. The third type of behavior occurs in the situation in which wages and
employment move in the same direction, which corresponds to the "effi-
cient bargaining model" (see e.g., Filer et al., 1996). Here the subject of
bargaining between managers and unions are both employment levels
and wage rates.
As for transitional economies, such a situation occurs when the consoli-
date power of unions (or other nonunion groups) and government
authorities is used not only for bargaining on wage rates, but also on the
employment level. Managers may use this situation to increase the
status of their firm because the social importance of an enterprise and
its ability to press on local government seeking some privileges depend
on the number of employees.
All three cases suppose that any wage-profit combination, including
negative profit, exists under the conditions of soft budget constraints.
The government's solution whether to subsidize an enterprise has an im-
pact on the wage rate, independent from the employment level and en-
terprise value added.
4. The fourth type of behavior corresponds to the situation in which the
firm reduces employment in response to wage increases, but the wage
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level is lower than the marginal revenue product of labor. In the litera-
ture, this situation is defined as the "cost of labor turnover hypothesis"
(see Prasnicar et al., 1994). It can be interpreted as the firm's opportu-
nity to pass on to employees the costs of labor turnover which results
from the firm's great bargaining power in comparison with employees'
(or unions) power
5. Finally it is possible to emphasize one more type of behavior (the fifth
type — intermediate between the first and second types of behavior),
when the enterprise reduces employment in response to wage in-
creases, but the wage level is higher than the marginal revenue product
of labor. Thus the point of contract lies to the right of the labor demand
curve. This situation shows the great bargaining power of workers (un-
ions) which secure the growth of wages together with the decrease of
employment but employment goes down more slowly than it is supposed
according to the labor demand curve.
Our conceptual framework is depicted in Fig. 1.2 Here we can see two
iso-profit curves: maximum profit and zero profit and also the standard
labor demand curve LD.
Point A is the point of the short-run labor demand equilibrium in the
                                               
2 Such types of figures are often used in the analysis of firm behavior (McDonald
and Solow, 1981). Here we use figures from Prasnikar, Svejnar et al. (1994) and
Basu, Estrin , and Svejnar (1997) with some modifications.
R
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competitive labor market when the competitive wage equals the marginal
revenue product of labor under the conditions of profit maximization
(cost minimization). The minimum acceptable level of wages W* and
corresponding employment rate L* characterize this situation.
The labor demand curve (we are moving from point A to point C) repre-
sents the first type of firm behavior. This is the right-to-manage model.
Here the subject of bargaining between the firm and the union is wage
levels, allowing the employer complete discretion over employment.
The contract curve AD represents the second type of firm behavior,
when constant employment level L* accompanies wage increases (and
corresponding profit decreases).
The third type of firm behavior, when the subject of bargaining between
managers and unions are both employment levels and wage rates, cor-
responds to the contract curve AE.
All three cases suppose any wage-profit combination, including negative
profit under the conditions of soft budget constraints. In other words, the
concrete point of contract could lie anywhere in the area A – C, A – D,
A – E and also above the iso-profit curve π = 0.
The fourth type of behavior, when the firm reduces employment in
response to wage increases, although the wage level is lower than
the marginal revenue product of labor, is represented by the contract
curve AB.
The fifth (intermediate) type of behavior, when the enterprise reduces
employment in response to wage increases, but the wage level is higher
than the marginal revenue product of labor, corresponds to the contract
curve AF.
Based on this approach, our task is to define what type of enterprise be-
havior was formed during transition and to estimate its changes over
time. We also will try to estimate the degree of influence the following
factors have on this behavior: form of ownership, variant of privatization
and corresponding structure of ownership, the size and the location of
an enterprise, etc.
We suppose to verify the following hypothesis:
a) the hypothesis about changes in enterprise behavior over time:
• over the process of time, enterprises of any form of ownership and
legal form will demonstrate better adjustment of their employment to
shifts in production;
• the employment and wage-setting behavior of enterprises with vari-
ous legal forms and forms of ownership will differ from each other in
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the beginning of transition, but over the process of time these differ-
ences will become smaller;
b) the hypothesis about the correlation between enterprise characteris-
tics and their behavior:
• the following types of enterprises will aim to maintain the employment
level:
• enterprises with the a great share of state ownership;
• privatized enterprises with a great share of insider's ownership;
• enterprises with strong influence of unions;
• enterprises which are located in areas where the opportunities of in-
dustrial employment are restricted and alternative employment may
be housekeeping or working on an individual farm.
3. MODEL
The problem of constructing a model for estimating the type of behavior
is connected with the choice of model used for estimating the wage-
setting and employment behavior of enterprises in the Russian economy.
Schaffer and Luke (2000) note that the choice of model is a difficult
problem because there are not enough empirical data which allow one to
estimate whether bargaining about employment and not only about
wages take place. At the same time such a process as labor hoarding
may be interpreted not only in the framework of an effective bargaining
model, but also using the "right to manage" model if high elasticity of
wages are assumed. The authors says that both above-mentioned mod-
els come to similar final equations and refer to the opinion of Booth
(1995) who says that there are no precise criteria which allow one to
distinguish the difference between these models. In our empirical work
both models are used.
We estimate the following equations, based on the standard theory of
dynamic labor demand with adjustment costs. Probably the most com-
monly estimated model begins with the minimization of discounted future
costs (see e.g., Singer, 1996).
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given that production equals demand.
τττ +++ = ttt QLKQ ),( ,  t∀ , (2)
where E is the expectation operator, r denotes the economy-wide inter-
est rate, K denotes the capital, L denotes labor, c denotes the firm's
capital costs, w denotes wages, p denotes costs of adjustment of labor,
e denotes the costs of adjustment of capital, and Q denotes the output
demand (production volume).
The model thus assumes that the firm faces quadratic costs of changing
employment and capital. The adjustment cost function is assumed to be
additively separable in hires and investment so that we focus solely on
employment decisions (see e.g., Machin et al., 1993). The symmetry of
adjustment costs is really an unrealistic assumption that is easily criti-
cized (see e.g., Hamermesh, 1989), but our sample does not contain
data on hires or fires, so we assume that firms cannot fire and hire si-
multaneously and 1−−=∆ tt LLL .
The equation derived under these assumptions is (Singer, 1996):
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where L denotes labor, L* denotes the expectation of the long-term
equilibrium level of labor, and µ, ξ, ψ are parameters.
The expression for the expected long-term equilibrium of employment is
usually formulated as the log-linear form of the expectations of demand
and the ratio of wages and costs of capital (interest rate) and a time
dummy, proxying technological change and other time-specific factors. If
the logs of labor and the ratio of wages and capital costs both follow an
AR(1) process, the typical equation derived in terms of observable vari-
ables is
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where D denotes a vector of time dummies, ω is an error and µ, α, β, γ, δ
are parameters to be estimated.
The equation (4) may be specified as
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Since we estimate the model on panel data, we use subscript i to denote
firms. We test for exogeneity using the Hausman test.
Since the data on the capital costs are unavailable, we approximate the
capital costs with time dummies following Singer (1996) and Basu et al.
(1997), and thus vector Di, t includes ci, t. Then, our theoretical model
supposes the heterogeneity of labor. At the first stage of our research
we suppose that the firm does not treat labor as homogenous, so more
lagged values of labor should be put into the equation. In the typical
case of two groups of workers, the equation derived by aggregating la-
bor over the two categories also involves the second lag of the depend-
ent variable (Nickell, 1984, 1986). At the first stage of research, we have
introduced in (4) a general dynamic framework by allowing the left-hand
side variable and the right-hand side variables to enter into the current,
one year and two year lagged forms. But the results of our analysis indi-
cated the insignificance of the second lag. We use the second lag of the
dependent variable as an instrumental variable.
Our dummies are as follows.3
Ownership. We divide our sample depending on the share of different
groups of owners. We already defined these groups of owners as part-
ners in the bargaining process: employers (managers); inside owners
(employees); outside owners and the government. Since the main legal
form of an enterprise is a joint-stock company, we group enterprises ac-
cording to some critical shares of capital, which give each stockholder
different opportunities to affect the enterprise's behavior according to
the existing legislation.
It is common knowledge that if the group of owners holds less than 1%
of shares, it cannot affect enterprise behavior without an agreement with
other stockholders. On the contrary when the share of the group is more
than 50%, this group can make decisions without other owners, including
reorganization and liquidation of the enterprise. As the first-hand data on
ownership structure of the majority of enterprises are inaccessible for us,
we construct this variable based on some indirect indicators, such as le-
gal form, chosen variant of privatization, etc., in the following way:
a) We define the enterprise as insider-dominated (dummy variable
"INS") if it was privatized by workers buy-outs or it is a producer's coop-
erative. The insider share is also significant when the total number of
employees is less than 1,000 and the enterprise was privatized using the
second variant of privileges.
                                               
3 For a list of regression variables — see Appendix A.
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b) We define the enterprise as manager-dominated (dummy variable
"MAN") if the number of employees is less than 300 and this enterprise
was privatized using the first or the second variant of privileges.
c) It is an outsider-dominated enterprise (dummy variable "OUT") if this
enterprise employs more than 300 people and was privatized using the
first variant of privileges and also if it is a large-sized enterprise (more
than 1000 employees) with no emphasis on the variant of privatization.
d) We segregate state enterprises into the following groups: joint stock
companies with a 75 – 100% state share (dummy variable "G100"); en-
terprises where the state share in capital is more than 50% but less than
75% (dummy variable "G50 – 75"); enterprises with a "gold share"
which gives the state the right of veto (dummy variable "ZOL"). We also
aggregate all the above-mentioned groups into the one variable – "en-
terprises with great state influence" (dummy variable "GVL").
Unions' activity. Here we use information about the existence of a
strong trade-union organization at the enterprise (dummy variable "UN").
We also  account for the signing of a labor contract between employers
and employees at the enterprise (dummy variable "DOGOVOR").
The size. We divide enterprises into different groups based on the total
number of employees at the beginning of transition (1991) (dummy vari-
ables "S1 – S4").
Enterprise location (dummies "REG – REG4").
REG — Novosibirsk,
REG1 — areas located not far from Novosibirsk (about 2 hours by elec-
tric train),
REG2 — areas located far away from Novosibirsk,
REG3 — industrial cities in the Novosibirsk region,
REG4 — areas located in the far backcountry areas of the Novosibirsk
region.
That kind of stratification allows us to find the features of enterprise
wage-setting and employment behavior depending on the characteristics
of the local labor market. On the one hand, it determines the opportuni-
ties for finding a new job for redundant workers; on the other hand, it
defines the enterprise's ability to recruit new employees.
Industry. We define the principal industries according to the two-digit
branch-wise classification (OKONH) and all other industries – according
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to three-digit classification. Here we are trying to capture industry spe-
cific characteristics (dummies "OT1 – OT12").
State support. We define an enterprise as a state supported one if
during the some period it got some kind of privileges from state authori-
ties: reduction of energy payments, tax remissions (dummy "GOS").
Excess wage tax. We suppose that the excess wage tax sometimes
prevented mass lay-offs during 1993 – 1995 (dummy "TAX").
Privatization characteristics. We also suppose that employment is
affected by the amount of time passed after privatization (dummies
"P1 – P7") and the variant of privatization (dummies "V1 – V4", where
V1 – V3 corresponds to the variant of privileges, according to the Rus-
sian program of privatization and V4 — means an employee buy-out). We
also constructed a dummy named "SVPR", which is equal to one if the
enterprise is free in its decision to go private and to choose its variant of
privatization, and zero otherwise. According to the Russian privatization
program, if a state enterprise had more than 199 employees and less
than 1000 employees as well as fixed assets valued more than 1000
Roubles and less than 50000 Roubles before privatization, then it had
the right to choose the variant of privatization.
Wage arrears. We treat the indicator of wage arrears4 (variable "K" is
the ratio of wage arrears to annual wage fund) as a "negative" wage. On
the one hand, the value of wage arrears is connected to the local labor
market conditions; on the other, in the framework of our analysis, the
level of wage arrears may be treated as the outcome of the bargaining
process. Subject to the situation in the local labor market, managers and
outside owners may use wage arrears as a tool for decreasing costs and
increasing profits or as a mean to solve some other problems which are
not necessary connected with the enterprise activities. In order to keep
the number of working places, employees and unions also accept wage
arrears mainly because of the local labor market conditions. Insiders who
have a relatively great share of enterprise ownership may benefit from
this situation. We treat this parameter as an endogenous variable and in-
strument it with the lag variable of wage arrears.
                                               
4 Our hypothesis about the influence of wage arrears on enterprise behavior is
based on the results of research made by Earle and Sabirianova (1998), and Le-
man et al. (1999).
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Then our equation looks like
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where K is the variable of wage arrears, and T is the period after privati-
zation (for the privatized enterprises). We shall use the price index of the
appropriate sector of industry during the examining period as a deflator.
The coefficient η1 may be interpreted as a correction to the short-term
and long-term elasticities of employment with respect to the wage.
Equation (6) is a relatively general model. We test the various restrictions
by using the Hausman test. We also test the hypotheses about endoge-
neity of variables using IV estimations.
The results of our analysis permit us to estimate the traditional labor de-
mand model which supposes that wages are the subject of bargaining,
allowing employer complete discretion over employment using the crite-
rion of cost minimization. Thus we shall test the "right-to-manage"
model (the first type in the above-mentioned classification).
The second stage is connected with estimating the "efficient bargaining"
model. Using the bargaining models (Prasnicar et al., 1994; Basu et al.,
1997) and supposing that there is constant elasticity of substitution
technology, we are able to derive the following employment equation,
which from the econometrical aspect is a relatively straightforward ex-
tension of the basic labor demand model.
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where w a is the alternative (reservation) wage, σ is the constant elastic-
ity of substitution between labor and capital in production, and ξ is the
weight that the firm places on employment relative to wages.
The analysis of our results is based on the estimation of ξ.
ξ = 0 corresponds to the situation in which the firm places no weight on
employment, the coefficient of the alternative wage is zero and the
specification reduces to the standard labor demand equation (6) and the
first type of firm behavior in our classification.
When the firm places equal weight on wages and employment (ξ = 1),
the coefficient on its own wage is zero and employment is driven by the
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alternative wage. It is consistent with the second type of behavior — so-
cially efficient labor allocation (strongly efficient contract).
For ξ > 1, one obtains a positive coefficient for the wage variable and a
negative one for the alternative wage variable — this is the third type of
behavior ("efficient bargaining model").
For ξ < 0, the coefficient for the alternative wage is positive and for the
firm's own wage — negative, so employment rises together with an in-
crease in own wage and an increase in the alternative wage. This situa-
tion corresponds to the monopolistic position of the firm on the local la-
bor market when the bargaining power of the firm is relatively higher in
comparison with the bargaining power of other groups. This is the hy-
pothetical fourth type of behavior.
0 < ξ < 1 correspond to the intermediate type of enterprise behavior,
between the first and second types.
Specification of the alternative wage is formulated as a function of some
variables in several studies (Basu et al., 1997), and also as an index
(Prasnicar et al., 1994; Commander et al., 1996).
We use both approaches.
1) We directly derive this index taking into account the existence of ar-
rears not only in wages but also in unemployment benefits. Thus specifi-
cation of the alternative wage equation will be as follows:
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where rew  is the average monthly wage for the corresponding area of
Novosibirsk region, rρ is the probability to losing one's job (the share of
unemployed in the given area), correspondingly (1 – rρ ) is the probabil-
ity of being employed; and rtψ is the share of wages which are paid dur-
ing the year as an unemployment benefit taking into account the delay of
such payments (see Appendix D#5).
2) In order to obtain the comparable data, we also use the indirect esti-
mation of an alternative wage thereby postulating that the alternative
wage is an inverse linear function of local unemployment and industry
dummy variables (Basu et al., 1997).
                                               
5  All information marked # is available on the EERC Web site
http://www.eerc.ru/publications.
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We also include the value of capital and circulating assets of the firm in
the beginning of transition (1991) as an explanatory variable because we
assume that during the transition, the assets that planners allocated to
enterprises influenced employment behavior.
In this part of analysis our approach differs from that used by Basu et al.
(1997), where one-year lagged capital assets of the firm were used as
an explanatory variable. This difference is caused by the features of Rus-
sian reappraisals of capital assets which have distorted the data of sub-
sequent years.
We estimate equation (6) in the following form:
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where 1991iA  is the average annual capital and circulating assets of the
enterprise i in the beginning of transition (1991); 21,νν  are coefficients.
Finally in the third stage of our research which follows the work of Basu
et al. (1997), we estimate jointly a wage and employment equation. Us-
ing equation (7) and supplementing it with a wage equation allows for
the possibility that workers appropriate some of the enterprise-specific
rents in their wages. We must test the hypothesis that in addition to ex-
ogenous factors, wage may depend on enterprise characteristics (Basu
et al., 1997). The employment equation is as follows:
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where Q/L is sales per employee, and M is the vector of relevant vari-
ables that may affect wages in a given firm. The variables of vector M
may be as follows: the ratio of enterprise receivables to sales and inclu-
sion in the list (registry) of monopolists according to the data regional
Antitrust committee.
Unlike for Basu et al. (1997) the data on the firm market share is inac-
cessible for us. So we use a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
enterprise is registered in the list of monopolists according to the data
from the regional Antitrust committee as a proxy of significant market
power.
Instead of using the variable for export share in production, we use the
ratio of receivables to the volume of production. Less than 1% of the
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enterprises in our sample are exporters and our explanatory variables in-
dicate the market power of the firm — the lower this ratio the more suc-
cessful is the firm in its attempts to make its partners to fulfill contracts. .
We estimate our wage equation using the local employment rate in order
to test if local demand and supply of labor affect wages. This "wage
curve" hypothesis (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995) is used to determine
if such a connection exists in the Russian case or not.
The endogeneity of labor productivity must be tested the same way as in
equation (6). The following parameters will prove the validity of our hy-
potheses:
• the value of parameter ξ: its variation, especially in the interval [0, 1],
will reveal changes occurring in the emphasis on wages and employ-
ment in enterprise behavior;
• the values of parameters α0, β0, ϕ2 in equations (6) and (9) which
characterize the short-run elasticity;
• the values of the coefficients of dummies and explanatory variables.
In order to determine the bargaining power of different partners and the
model of behavior, we estimate equations (6) – (9) for the subsamples
according to the following criteria:
• whether or not a labor contract between managers and employees of
the enterprise was signed;
• whether or not the enterprise obtained state support during the ex-
amining period;
• what group of owners dominated the enterprise — state, managers,
outside owners or inside owners.
The values and variations of the coefficients of short-run elasticity and
parameter ξ will allow us make some conclusions about the tendency of
different bargaining partners to follow one of the above-mentioned mod-
els of behavior and about their abilities to achieve their goals.
4. DATA
The industry of the Novosibirsk region has undergone significant
changes during the last six years. The basis of the regional industry has
been formed by large-sized machine-building enterprises and other en-
terprises in the military-industrial field of production while other enter-
prises (metallurgy, power engineering industries etc.) only supplied mili-
tary industrial complex.
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The share of machine-building industry out of the total region's produc-
tion volume was equal to 38.5% in 1990. For the examining period,
1994 – 1998, the total output decline was more than 50%: the volume of
production in 1998 made up 46.5% of the volume in 1992. As for the
volume of machine-building production in 1993 – 1998, it declined more
than four times: the 1998 production level was equal to 24.2% of the
1992 volume of production
The collapse of internal production demand in the Novosibirsk region
was not compensated by any increase in external demand. Only four or
five enterprises of the Novosibirsk region currently export their products.
At the same time the total number of industrial employees in the Novo-
sibirsk region has been reduced by 1.85 times and the employment in
machine-building has been reduced by more than twice. Thus a new
type of wage-setting and employment behavior has occurred under the
conditions of a severe exogenous shock caused by recession.
The object of study is the data on the industrial enterprises. The time
interval for analysis is 1994 – 1998. The data has been obtained from
the Novosibirsk Regional Committee of State Statistics, Novosibirsk Re-
gional Property Fund, Novosibirsk Regional Committee of State Owner-
ship, Novosibirsk Regional Antitrust Committee, and Federal Department
of Employment Service of the Novosibirsk Region. Our sample includes
old enterprises of different legal and ownership forms (state, coopera-
tives, privatized enterprises) which existed before transition as well as
new private ones.
Large-sized and medium-sized enterprises of the Novosibirsk region
produced more than 80% of the aggregate production of the Novosibirsk
region and employed more than 85% of the region's industrial labor
force in 1994 – 1998. For most of the industrial sectors, these values
vary between 60 – 98% for production as well as for employment. Thus,
one can say that the behavior of large-sized and medium-sized enter-
prises has a great impact on the behavior of the Novosibirsk region's in-
dustry as a whole. The exceptions are the milling and grain industry,
where the number of small-sized enterprises is traditionally great, and
industry that includes "other sectors of industry."
Our sample characterizes the behavior of the majority of large-sized and
medium-sized enterprises of all industrial sectors of the Novosibirsk
region. In our sample, the share of large-sized and medium-sized enter-
prises in industrial production and industrial employment is more
than 2/3: from 66.7 tî 100%. The exception is the engineering industry,
where military-industrial enterprises were eliminated from the sample.
Table C1# shows that the decrease in the average number of employ-
ees may be explained by the total production recession and the corre-
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sponding decrease in industrial employment, while the number of enter-
prises declines at a slower rate.
The amount of wage arrears and other non-payments sharply decreased
after the Russian financial crisis in 1994, but after this year one can ob-
serve a stable growth of the ratio of receivables to sales as well as the
ratio of wage arrears to wage fund. The ratio of wage arrears increases
regardless of whether local unemployment rises or not.
One can also find two opposite tendencies. On the one hand, the differ-
ences in sales, receivables and wage arrears between enterprises be-
come stronger; on the other hand, there is some stabilization in the
variation of the number of employees and wage level over time.
5. RESULTS
We made estimations and obtained results for the following periods:
1992 – 1993, 1994 – 1996, 1997 – 1998.
From the point of formation of enterprise wage-setting and employment
behavior, the first period corresponds to the pre-transition stage, the
second period covers the stage of intensive economic reforms (early
transition), and the third one is the period of enterprises' functioning af-
ter forming a new ownership structure.
1992 – 1993. We failed to estimate the IV equations because our data
did not allow us to create lagged variables that were used as instruments
in other equations. So we used OLS. Thus it will not be completely
correct to compare the obtained results with the following ones, but at
least we can show a general estimation of enterprises' behavior during
1992 – 1993 (see Tables C4 – C6#).
The main factor affecting the level of employment is the level of em-
ployment in the previous period. Sales and wages in the previous period
have a significant but weak influence on employment. We reject the hy-
pothesis about the formation of the "right to manage" model because
we did not find that an enterprises's own wage level influences employ-
ment.
Verifying the hypothesis about an effective bargaining model of behavior,
one can see that the coefficient of an enterprise's own wage level is in-
significant as is the coefficient of local unemployment (the indicator of
the alternative wage level). Thus employment is determined neither by its
own wage level nor by the alternative wage level.
Verification of the effective bargaining model hypothesis using equation
(7) gives a zero (insignificant) value for σ, and ξ,. But at the same time,
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the coefficient of the enterprise's own wage level become significant.
This provides some evidence that the behavior of enterprises corre-
sponds to the "right to manage" model.
The level of labor productivity affects the wage level during this period of
time, but the corresponding coefficient is rather small in comparison with
the other periods.
The following conclusion seems to be the most motivated. In the early
stage of transition, the employment level was determined neither by an
enterprise's wage level nor by an alternative wage level. The level of em-
ployment, sales and wages in the previous period determined the em-
ployment level in the current period. Thus it is impossible to make a con-
clusion about the formation of any particular model of enterprise wage
and employment behavior during 1992 – 1993.
The analysis of enterprise behavior after the beginning of real economic
reforms (1994) is in the focus of our research.
Unbalanced panels. Basic employment equation (6) is represented in
the Table B1 appendix B.
The given variables show higher explanatory power in comparison to
those specifications of equation which include groups of enterprises ac-
cording to the state share of capital, to the legal form, and to the division
of enterprises into old ones and newly created ones.
The elasticity of employment with respect to sales is the starting point of
our analysis.
We obtain slow growth of short-run elasticity of employment with respect
to sales from 0.1 to 0.3. One possible explanation is the positive role of
the abolishment of the excess wage tax.
Our results are in consensus with those obtained by other researchers,
with some variation in short-run elasticities at the initial period of transi-
tion. Commander et al. report 0.03 elasticity (Commander et al., 1996)
and Basu et al. estimate the elasticity for Russia to be equal to zero
(Basu et al., 1997).
Basically the shifts in short-run elasticity of wages with respect to sales
support the hypothesis about some positive changes in the adjustment
of the firm's behavior while the absolute value of the coefficient remains
relatively low and indicates that the degree of employment adjustment to
sales is very low. According to Basu et al. (1997), the elasticities of em-
ployment to sales of Czech firms, which initially (1990 – 1991) was as
low as in our sample, grew to 0.5 – 0.6 two years later.
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Higher but unstable short-run elasticities were obtained in the more mar-
ket-oriented countries such as Poland and Hungary — respectively 0.4
and 0.5 – 0.7.
The long-run elasticity of employment with respect to sales remains sta-
ble at the 0.6 – 0.7 level during the whole time period. Other postsocial-
ist countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) also show
relatively stable, but higher coefficients — 0.9 – 0.95.
Our second point of interest is the elasticity of employment with respect
to wages. This indicator also shows the gradual adjustment of enter-
prises in our sample to the changes in the economic environment. At the
initial period the sign was negative and equal to –0.17, then its absolute
value rose to –0.35.
Our results show that firms adjust employment to wage changes more
than to sales changes. But looking at the corresponding indicators for
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland (Basu et al., 1997),
we can conclude that the degree of adjustment of enterprises in the No-
vosibirsk region is lower. The short-run elasticity of employment with re-
spect to wages in these countries is expected to be from –0.6 to –0.96.
The only exception is Slovakia where in 1992 this coefficient was equal
to –0.25, but it was not highly significant. Slovakia is very close to Russia
in its traditions of a centrally planned economy and the structure of the
Slovakian industry is also very similar to the Novosibirsk region's industry
because of the high share of large-sized machine-building enterprises.
The distinctive feature of long-run employment elasticity with respect to
wages is its positive sign in the beginning of transition that reflects the
specificity of the previous period when employment and wages moved in
the same direction. But this coefficient is unstable. We can say that in
other transition countries, long-run elasticities are also unstable: for ex-
ample, the Czech indicator LRE varied from –1.2 to 0 (statistically insig-
nificant). These data show that enterprises adjust behavior to the
changes in wages more than to the changes in sales.
We obtain stable and significant coefficients for the dummies, which
characterize the time passed since privatization of the enterprise; thus
the time of privatization has an impact on enterprises' wage-setting and
employment behavior during the early transition period but this influence
disappears later on.
Our dummies also show that during 1994 – 1996, the employment be-
havior of enterprises located not far away from Novosibirsk differ from
the behavior of Novosibirsk ones. We can suppose that the potential op-
portunities to get a job for workers from these not very distant from the
Novobirsk areas are high because they have a chance to find another job
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in Novosibirsk, while enterprises' opportunities to employ qualified work-
ers from Novosibirsk are relatively low. That's why enterprises hoard
labor.
Behavior of enterprises owned by managers statistically differs from the
behavior of enterprises owned by insiders (not managers). It is not un-
usual because without any restraints from other owners, managers will
strive to increase their own income and to reduce excess labor. Man-
ager-dominated enterprises have 6 – 7.5% less employees in compari-
son with insider-dominated enterprises.
The employment level in the enterprises with 100% state ownership
was higher in comparison with enterprises with insider ownership
during 1994 – 1996. However, we failed to find any impact of state sup-
port upon employment behavior. The effect of a union's bargaining
power was obtained only in 1994 – 1996, but its absolute value is rather
small –0.05.
Balanced panel. Our balanced data set contains only privatized enter-
prises and state enterprises prohibited from privatization. The total num-
ber of enterprises in this sample is about half of those from the unbal-
anced panel6.
This number of enterprises in the balanced and unbalanced panels
displays not only the process of enterprise turnover (breakups, spinoffs
and other forms of entry and exit). Some enterprises were excluded from
the sample because of changes in composing statistical accounts.
For example, the changes in legislative norms regarding the number
of employees which comprise a small-sized enterprise lead to changes
in the established order of the statistical accounts, and therefor much
information became unavailable. Also in the early transition period
(1993 – 1995), some enterprises existed but did not file the necessary
statistical information with the Regional Committee of State Statistics
Nevertheless, the balanced panel allows us to estimate features of be-
havior of "old" enterprises that existed before transition and survived
during the first seven years of transition. A comparison of the corre-
sponding short-run and long-run elasticities of employment with respect
to sales and elastisities of employment with respect to wages of the bal-
anced panel with those of the unbalanced panels shows that these coef-
ficients do not differ systematically.
                                               
6 For example: Basu et al. (1997) formed a balanced panel only for one quarter of
the total number of Czech firms, one third of the total number of Slovak firms, and
about 80% of Polish firms.
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Some dummy variables have a higher absolute value in comparison with
the unbalanced panel in the first period (1994 – 1996): we found that the
signing of a labor contract by strong unions has a greater positive influ-
ence on employment and a greater negative correlation between em-
ployment and domination of managers as owners. But these differences
disappear during the next period (1997 – 1998). Thus, it confirms our
hypothesis about the smoothing of the differences in wage-setting and
employment behavior over time.
Table B2 represents the estimation of equation (6a). Here we estimate
the elasticity of employment with respect to wages and local employment
level (in different areas of the Novosibirsk region and in Novosibirsk). As
it was mentioned above, unemployment serves as an indirect indicator of
alternative wages.
Similarly to equation (6), we obtain negative and statistically significant
wage coefficients. At the same time unemployment coefficients are sta-
tistically insignificant. That is, the contract curve is the standard labor
demand curve. Thus, the model of enterprise behavior corresponds to
the "right to manage" model and ξ = 0. These conclusions are true both
for the unbalanced and balanced panels.
Some studies of wage-setting and employment behavior in transition
(Basu et al., 1997) also determined the "right to manage" model as the
basic model. These researchers provide evidence that wage-setting and
employment behavior in the Czech Republic and Poland at the start of
transition was close to the "effective bargaining" model, but this model
has changed into the "right to manage" model later on.
Effective bargaining model. The estimations of coefficients of the ef-
fective bargaining model — equation (7) — are reported in Table B3.
Here we use the specification of alternative wages, represented in equa-
tion (8). Coefficients on the enterprise's own wages and on alternative
wages are the main indicators of enterprise behavior here.
We obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the firm's own wage
and a insignificant coefficient for the alternative wage both for the unbal-
anced and balanced panels. That is ξ = 0, and our contract curve is the
labor demand curve; thus, our model is the "right to manage."
We estimate wage elasticity with respect to sales per worker in Table B4
(equation 9). Some researchers (e.g., Commander, Dhar, and Yemtsov ,
1995) treat this parameter as a proxy of the firm's ability to pay. Our es-
timation shows that the short-run elasticity of wages with respect
to sales per employee has high, positive and statistically significant
coefficients. These coefficients increased from 0.62 (1994 – 1996) to
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0.86 (1997 – 1998) in the unbalanced panel and were stable during
1994 – 1998 in the balanced panel: from 0.69 to 0.67. This proves the
fact that employees systematically appropriate some of the firm-specific
rents in their wages. Probably the greater absolute value of this pa-
rameter for the unbalanced panel is the cause of the unstable financial
position of some enterprises in this panel.
At the same time the ratio of receivables to sales has some impact on
wages, but the sign of the corresponding coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant. So we obtained unexpected results because we supposed that a
lower value of receivables from customers indicates effective sales man-
agement that raises the firm's ability to pay off wages. Thus, the high
value of receivables from customers may be treated as an indicator of
high demand for enterprise production, while a low value shows that the
enterprise has no market for its products and thus doesn't have enough
money to pay off wages.
We also define some of the effects of state support. In 1994 – 1996,
state supported enterprises paid wages which were 13.3% higher than
others. We can draw the conclusion that state financial support was
spent for increasing wages and not for maintaining employment.
Our results differ sharply from other studies in this case. The results ob-
tained by Commander, Dhar, and Yemtsov (1995) estimate that the elas-
ticity of wages with respect to sales per employee in 1993 – 1994 for
Russia is equal to 10.2%, while the research of Basu et al. (1997) shows
statistically insignificant coefficients of the corresponding elasticity for
Russia. The short-run wage elasticities with respect to sales per worker
for other transition countries are essentially lower: 0.1 – 0.4.
An important part of our research was the verification of the "wage
curve" hypothesis. We failed to find any effect of local unemployment
upon wage outcomes because the corresponding coefficients are statis-
tically insignificant. Among other transition countries, the wage curve hy-
pothesis receives support only in Poland.
Equation (7) was estimated jointly with equation (9) (Table C3#). We
obtain quite a similar estimation of principal coefficients, so our results
are considered to be reliable.
In order to determine the influence of state financial support on enter-
prise performance, we estimate equations (6) – (9) separately for state
supported enterprises and for the non-supported ones.
The same analysis is carried out in order to explore the influence of
trade unions on enterprise behavior. In this case we divide our sample
into enterprises where a labor contract was signed and those where one
was not.
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We are also trying to find some specifics of enterprise behavior which
are dependent on the dominant group of owners – state, outsiders, in-
siders, managers. Thus we estimate equations (6) – (9) for every each
group of owners.
This analysis allows us to determine how some bargaining groups influ-
ence (directly or indirectly) the formation of the model of enterprises'
behavior.
We also take into account the endogeneity problem, i.e., that the domi-
nant group of owners can influence an enterprise's opportunities to get
state financial support and also the opportunities to sign a labor contract
between employers and employees. We estimate the probability of ob-
taining state support depending on the dominant group of owners, and
also the probability to sign a labor contract depending on the dominant
group of owners (Table C7#). The analysis shows that we cannot make
a conclusion about the existence of a stable correlation between any
group of owners and the opportunities to get state financial support or to
sign a labor contract.
Union's influence. The results of our estimations are represented in
Tables B5 – B8.
The estimation of equation (6) for the unbalanced panel shows that en-
terprises where a labor contract was signed have a higher absolute value
of short-run elasticity of employment with respect to sales and short-run
elasticity of employment with respect to wages during both time periods.
The estimations of equation (6a) for 1997 – 1998 give a negative
and significant value of the wage coefficient and an insignificant value of
the local unemployment coefficient. This corresponds to the "right to
manage" model and is confirmed by the estimation of equation (7)
further on.
The difference between enterprises with a labor contract and enterprises
without a labor contract existed in the first period (1994 – 1996). The
"right to manage" model corresponds to the behavior of enterprises with
a labor contract. As for the enterprises without a labor contract, one can
not make definite conclusions because according to equation (6a), the
insignificant coefficient of local unemployment and the significant coeffi-
cient of wages correspond to the condition of σ < 0, which does not sat-
isfy the initial conditions of the analysis, but at the same time equation
(7) supports the "right to manage" model.
Equation (9) represents the higher elasticity of wages with respect to la-
bor productivity for the enterprises with a labor contract (0.81 vs. 0.61).
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Thus, a signed labor contract leads to higher opportunities for employ-
ees to appropriate firm-specific rents in their wages.
Estimations for the balanced panel show greater differences in the model
of behavior for enterprises with a labor contract and enterprises without
a labor contract. Enterprises without a labor contract show zero elasticity
of employment with respect to wages; the value of parameter ξ < 0, i.e.,
the model of behavior corresponds to the "cost of labor turnover" hy-
pothesis when the contract curve is moved to the left from the labor de-
mand curve during 1994 – 1996. In the same time period, the behavior
of enterprises with a labor contract corresponds to the "right to manage"
model and thus their ξ = 0.
Enterprises without labor contracts behave according to the "right to
manage" model during the period 1997 – 1998. The contract curve of
enterprises with labor contracts during the corresponding period shows
the tendency of moving to the right from the labor demand curve —
ξ = 0.23 (0 < ξ < 1), but the significance level of this coefficient is 10%.
The coefficient of local unemployment in equation (6a) is insignificant but
positive. Hence there is a tendency to change the model of behavior
from the "right to manage" model to the intermediate type of behavior
(between the "right to manage" model and "socially efficient labor allo-
cation").
The conclusion is that the union's objectives for signing a labor contract
correspond to the "right to manage" model, i.e., most attention is paid
to wages. The greater transfers of firm-specific rent compensate the
employees. Unions of those enterprises that have survived during the
first stages of transition have gained some experience interacting with
managers and now they try to bargain about wages and employment si-
multaneously.
Influence of state financial support. Tables B9 – B12 represent the
results of our estimations for the enterprises which have state financial
support and which do not have any state financial support. According to
the analysis of the unbalanced panel, the model of behavior corresponds
to the "right to manage" model for both groups of enterprises. However
there are some differences in the short-run elasticity of employment with
respect to sales, in the short-run elasticity of employment with respect to
wages, and in the short-run elasticity of wages with respect to labor pro-
ductivity.
During the period 1994 – 1996, enterprises with state financial support
had a higher absolute value of short-run elasticity of employment with
respect to sales, but a lower short-run elasticity of employment with re-
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spect to wages in comparison with the other enterprises. And during
1997 – 1998, state supported enterprises had higher values of all the
above-mentioned elasticities, but non-supported enterprises had a
higher value of short-run elasticity of wages with respect to labor pro-
ductivity.
The analysis of the balanced panel shows similar results, but enterprises
with state support have higher short-run elasticity of wages with respect
to labor productivity.
One can summarize that state support does not result in a change in the
model of enterprise wage and employment behavior. Additional financial
resources provided by state authorities were redistributed to maintain the
wage level, at least in the first stage of economic reforms.
Influence of different groups of owners. Tables B13 – B16 represent
estimations for equations (6) – (9).
Enterprises, owned by the state or controlled by the state have the high-
est values of short-run elasticity of employment with respect to sales and
of short-run elasticity of employment with respect to wages for the un-
balanced panel 1994 – 1996. Other enterprises have a very low or sta-
tistically insignificant coefficient of short-run elasticity of employment
with respect to wages.
The local unemployment rate is significant and negative only for insiders'
enterprises. In combination with the negative and significant wage coeffi-
cient, this means that the behavior of this group of enterprises corre-
sponds to the "cost of labor turnover" model. Coefficient ξ = –0,46
(ξ < 0) confirms this conclusion.
The behavior of state enterprises corresponds to the "right to manage"
model and the negative and statistically significant coefficient of wages
and the statistically insignificant coefficient of local unemployment and
ξ = 0 prove this statement.
The insignificant wage and local unemployment coefficients for manager-
dominated and outsider-dominated enterprises are bound to mean that ξ
is uncertain. But the value of ξ corresponds to the "right to manage"
model for manager dominated enterprises and to the intermediate model
(0 < ξ < 1) for outsider dominated ones.
The short-run elasticity of wages with respect to labor productivity is sig-
nificant and positive for all types of enterprises, but it is higher for out-
sider dominated enterprises. The latter may be due to the situation that
outside owners were dispersed in the first stage of transition and thus
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were not able to affect the process of appropriation of enterprise-
specific rent.
The analysis of the unbalanced panel 1997 – 1998 shows results which
are quite similar with those obtained for the previous period. The coeffi-
cients of local unemployment are insignificant for all the groups, thus the
model of behavior in 1997 – 1998 is reduced to the "right to manage"
model.
There were also some changes in the short-run elasticity of wages with
respect to labor productivity during 1997 – 1998. These coefficients be-
came higher and significant for state enterprises, manager's enterprises
and became insignificant for insider's and outsider's enterprises.
The balanced panel shows similar results: state enterprises had the big-
gest values of short-run elasticities of employment with respect to sales
and with respect to wages during the first period. Coefficients of local
unemployment are insignificant for all groups of enterprises, but only
state enterprises have significant wage coefficients at the same time,
thus only their behavior may be determined as the "right to manage"
model.
The short-run elasticities of wages with respect to labor productivity are
significant and rather high for all groups of enterprises. The "right to
manage" model was determined to represent the behavior of state en-
terprises, insider's and manager's enterprises in the balanced panels
1997 – 1998.
Outsider's enterprises behave within the framework of the intermediate
model. This can be attributed to the fact that outsiders own enterprises
with complex production cycles (fuel and energy industry, metallurgy),
where the number of employees depends mainly on technological as-
pects. This prevents mass lay-offs even in the case of sharp output de-
cline. Only this group of enterprises has an insignificant coefficient of
short-run elasticity of employment with respect to sales.
There are no other changes in elasticity of wages with respect to labor
productivity in the manager's enterprises because their owners strive to
minimize the amount of enterprise-specific rent appropriated by workers.
Enterprises with a labor contract behave according to the "right to man-
age" model, while the model of behavior of enterprises without a labor
contract can change to the "cost of labor turnover" model under the
conditions of high bargaining power of managers.
At the same time the higher short-run elasticity of wages with respect to
labor productivity for the enterprises with a labor contract in comparison
with the other ones allows us to conclude that unions have essential bar-
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gaining power. Therefore, this bargaining power is in consensus with the
objectives of the unions in the framework of the "right to manage"
model. Some revision of this situation occurs only for "old enterprises"
with the "old" unions as they begin to take into account not only wages
but also employment; thus, the model of behavior of such enterprises
shifts to the "intermediate" model.
State financial support does not change the model of enterprise wage-
setting and employment behavior. And what is more, enterprises, con-
trolled by the state, also form their behavior according to the "right to
manage" model. Hence the "right to manage" model satisfies state in-
terests and state authorities do not strive to affect enterprise behavior
directly or indirectly in order to change the model of their behavior into
the model which provides more employment.
Managers without a doubt are interested in using the weak bargaining
power of employees and to change the enterprise behavior into the
"cost of labor turnover" model, but their attempts were successful only
during the first years of transition. Now they apply their bargaining power
to decrease the part of rent appropriated by employees.
The enterprises with dispersed insider ownership form the significant
part of insider's enterprises. This explains the stable, low and insignifi-
cant short-run elasticities of employment with respect to sales and with
respect to wages. The short-run elasticity of wages with respect to labor
productivity is also low. Under the conditions of an economic downturn
and decreasing labor productivity, this means the intention to maintain
the wage level. At the same time, inside owners are ready to restrain the
nominal wage level in order to improve the financial situation of their
enterprise. The model of enterprise behavior according to the "cost of
labor turnover" hypothesis in 1994 – 1996 proves this.
Outside owners are often limited in their abilities to affect enterprise be-
havior because of production cycle characteristics. Even when under the
conditions of output decline, the ability to hire workers is restricted. It
would be possible to determine outside owner's influence on enterprise
behavior under the conditions of economical upturn, but we do not have
this opportunity.
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CONCLUSION
The main objective of our research was to determine the type of em-
ployment and wage-setting behavior in the period of transition. We were
trying to estimate the influence of some enterprise-specific and common
economic factors. We postulate that any enterprise adjusts its behavior
to the changes in production demand with a different emphasis on
wages and on employment.
An enterprise can change employment and wages in the same direction
or maintain employment in response to a wage increase. It is also possi-
ble that an enterprise reduces employment in response to a rise in
wages and vice versa. The latter cases suppose any wage — marginal
labor product combination. When wages are equal to the marginal labor
product, our contract curve corresponds to the short-run labor demand
curve. If the difference between wages and marginal labor product is
positive, our contract curve shifts to the right of the labor demand curve;
if this difference is negative, our contract curve shifts to the left of the
labor demand curve.
The main results of our research are as follows:
1. At the beginning of transition (1992 – 1993), it was hard to speak
about any particular model of wage-setting and employment behavior.
The wage level and employment level were determined by sales, the
lagged wage level, and the lagged employment level, and were not sys-
tematically connected with each other.
The model of wage-setting and employment behavior has been formed
by the end of the examining period — in 1997 – 1998. According to this
model, the contract curve is similar to the short-run labor demand curve
and it is the "right to manage" model of behavior. The reasons for the
formation of such a model are the influence of unions and the state in
the sphere of wages and employment. Managers accept this model be-
cause they are interested in the coincidence of the contract curve with
the labor demand curve, and also they don't have enough bargaining
power to follow the "cost of labor turnover" model.
2. Over the process of time, enterprises adjust their behavior to changes
in output. And in recent years, the wage level adjusts to the output de-
cline faster than to employment (the absolute value of wage elasticity
with respect to sales is higher than the absolute value of employment
elasticity with respect to sales).
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3. Employees systematically appropriate some of the firm-specific rents
in their wages. The manager's bargaining power is seen in the decreas-
ing of rent appropriated by the employees of the manager's enterprises.
4. Wage arrears do not influence enterprise behavior.
5. State financial support does not affect the model of enterprise be-
havior significantly.
6. Domination of a certain group of owners has an impact on enterprise
behavior only during the first stage of transition — 1994 – 1996. Behavior
of all enterprises corresponds to the "right to manage" model after that
point in time.
7. The enterprise location affects its behavior systematically only if this
enterprise is located not far from Novosibirsk. As in a previous case, by
the end of the examining period any differences in behavior of enter-
prises with different locations disappears.
8. We failed to find any significant influence of the freedom to go private
or to choose the variant of privatization.
9. The common tendency of wage-setting and employment behavior
formation is connected with the changes in the Russian economy and
the economy of the Novosibirsk region. Some factors showed statistically
significant means in 1996 and that may be connected with the abolish-
ment of the excess wage tax., but the following years eliminated this ef-
fect. We suppose that changes in the Russian economy as a whole had
the greatest impact on enterprise behavior especially because 1996 was
the year of presidential elections.
Between-countries comparisons. The degree of adjustment of enter-
prises of Novosibirsk region is lower than for the majority of other post-
socialist countries — the absolute values of the short-run elasticities of
employment with respect to sales and with respect to wages are lower
for Novosibirsk enterprises.
Slovakia is the only exception because it has quite similar indicators
(short-run elasticity of employment with respect to wages). This can be
attributed to the fact that Slovakia is closer to Russia in its centralized
planned economy traditions and also because the industrial structure of
Slovakia with a great share of large-sized machine-building enterprises is
similar to the structure of Novosibirsk region's industry.
Our results allow some policy implications. The better adjustment of en-
terprises to the changes in demand (growth of employment elasticity
with response to sales) means that state authorities must be prepared
that current unemployment will increase. The number of employees will
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rise together with the growth of output, but this growth will hardly lead to
the recovering of the previous employment level, even if the pre-reform
level of output will be restored.
We do not find any systematic effect of union activities on enterprise be-
havior during the later years (1997 – 1998). Our analysis shows that the
wage level, fixed on the base of industrial agreements, is the only guid-
ing line for wage behavior of all enterprises (unionized or not) in industry.
High elasticity of the wages with respect to sales per employee is evi-
dence of the ability of the workers to appropriate some of the firm-
specific rents in their wages. This situation is stable and enterprises are
losing their internal resources of investments; authorities must take this
fact into account while bargaining with employers and unions.
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APPENDIX A
A1. Calculation of regression variables
All performance money measures are calculated in constant 1993 prices.
Source of information: Novosibirsk Regional Goskomstat.
L — number of employees;
Ln L — logarithm of the number of employees Ln L = ln (L);
Q — sales (thousands roubles, taking into account denomination);
Ln q — logarithm of sales Ln q = ln (Q)
Wage — wage fund (thousands roubles, taking into account denomina-
tion);
Ln wage — logarithm of average monthly wage per employee, Ln wage =
= ln (wage/L/12);
Ln ql — logarithm of sales per employee, Ln ql = ln (Q/L);
K — the ratio of wage arrears to annual wage fund, K = Wage
arrears / wage;
M — the ratio of an enterprise's receivables to sales, M = Receivables / Q;
Assets91 — fixed and circulating assets in 1991;
Reg = 1, if enterprise is located in Novosibirsk, 0 — otherwise;
Reg1 = 1, if enterprise is located in one of Novosibirsk region's industrial
centers (Iskitim, Berdsk, Barabinsk, Kuibishev) but not in Novosibirsk,
0 — otherwise;
Reg2 = 1, if enterprise is located not far (about 2 hours by electric train)
from Novosibirsk (Novosibirsky region, Kolivansky region, Bolotninsky re-
gion, Toguchinsky region, Cherepanovsky region, the town of Ob,
Moshkovsky region, Kochenevsky region), 0 — otherwise;
Reg3 = 1, if enterprise is located far away from Novosibirsk (Kargatsky
region, Maslyaninsky region, Tatarsky region, Ordinsky region, Chanov-
sky region, Cuzunsky region, Ubinsky region), 0 — otherwise;
Reg4 = 1, if enterprise is located in the far backcountry areas of Novo-
sibirsk region, (Karasuksky region, Kupinsky region, Krasnozersky re-
gion, Ust-Tarsky region, Severny region, Chistozerny region, Kochkovsky
WAGE-SETTING AND EMPLOYMENT BEHAVIOR OF ENTERPRISES40
region, Kishtovsky region, Vengerovsky region, Zdvinsky region, Dovo-
lensky region), 0 — otherwise;
Ot1 = 1, if enterprise belongs to fuel and energy industry, 0 — otherwise
(OKONH = 11...);
Ot2 = 1, if enterprise belongs to coal, iron and steel industry, 0 — other-
wise (OKONH = 12...);
Ot3 = 1, if enterprise belongs to chemical and petrochemical industry,
0 — otherwise (OKONH = 13...);
Ot4 = 1, if enterprise belongs to engineering industry, 0 — otherwise
(OKONH = 14...);
Ot5 = 1, if enterprise belongs to woodworking and pulp and paper in-
dustry industry, 0 — otherwise (OKONH = 15...);
Ot6 = 1, if enterprise belongs to the industry of construction materials,
0 — otherwise (OKONH = 16...);
Ot7 = 1, if enterprise belongs to light industry, 0 — otherwise (OKONH =
= 17...);
Ot8 = 1, if enterprise belongs to food processing industry, 0 — otherwise
(OKONH = 18...);
Ot9 = 1, if enterprise belongs to microbiological industry, 0 — otherwise
(OKONH = 191...);
Ot10 = 1, if enterprise belongs to milling and grain industry, 0 — other-
wise (OKONH = 192...);
Ot11 = 1, if enterprise belongs to medical industry, 0 — otherwise
(OKONH = 193..);
Ot12 = 1, if enterprise belongs to publishing and printing industry,
0 — otherwise (OKONH = 194...);
Ot13 = 1, if enterprise belongs to other sectors of industry, 0 — other-
wise (OKONH = 197...);
Unempl — unemployment rate in the year t.
Source of information: Register of Novosibirsk Regional Antitrust
Committee.
Mon = 1, if enterprise is included in the list (registry) of monopolists in
the year t, 0 — otherwise.
Source of information: Novosibirsk Regional State Property Fund
and Novosibirsk Regional State Property Committee.
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A2. Date of privatization
Ð1 = 1, if it is the first year after privatization, 0 — otherwise;
Ð2 = 1, if it is the second year after privatization, 0 — otherwise;
Ð3 = 1, if it is the third year after privatization, 0 — otherwise;
Ð4 = 1, if it is the fourth year after privatization, 0 — otherwise;
Ð5 = 1, if it is the fifth year after privatization, 0 — otherwise;
Ð6 = 1, if it is the sixth year after privatization, 0 — otherwise;
P7 = 1, if it is the seventh year after privatization, 0 — otherwise.
A3. The number of employees before privatization
S1 = 1, if it is an enterprise with 199 employees or less in 1991,
0 — otherwise;
S2 = 1, if it is an enterprise with 200 to 499 employees in 1991,
0 — otherwise;
S3 = 1, if it is an enterprise with 500 to 999 employees in 1991,
0 — otherwise;
S4 = 1, if it is an enterprise with more than 1000 employees in 1991,
0 — otherwise.
A4. State ownership and variant of privatization
g100 = 1, if the state share in the enterprise's authorized capital stock is
100% in the year t, 0 — otherwise;
g5075 = 1, if the state share in the enterprise's authorized capital stock
is from 50% äî 75%, in the year t, 0 — otherwise;
zol = 1, if the state is the owner of the "gold share" of the enterprise in
the year t, 0 — otherwise;
v1 = 1, if the enterprise was privatized by using the first variant of privi-
leges in the year t, 0 — otherwise;
v2 = 1, if the enterprise was privatized by using the second variant of
privileges in the year t, 0 — otherwise;
v3 = 1, if the enterprise was privatized by using the third variant of privi-
leges in the year t, 0 — otherwise;
v4 = 1, if the enterprise was privatized by leasing (employee buy-out) in
the year t, 0 — otherwise.
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A5. Dominant owners
Man = 1, if the enterprise is owned by managers in the year t,
0 — otherwise;
Man = 1, if (V2 = 1 | V1 = 1) & L < 300;
Out = 1, if the enterprise is owned by outsiders in the year t, 0 — other-
wise;
Out = 1, if (V1 = 1 & L > 300) | employees>1000;
Ins = 1, if the enterprise is owned by insiders in the year t, 0 — other-
wise;
Ins = 1 if V4=1 | (V2=1 & L < 1000).
Source of information: Programs of Privatization in Russian Fed-
eration.
Svpr = 1, if the enterprise is free in its decision to go private, i.e., it was
not prohibited from privatization in the Program, 0 — otherwise.
Source of information: Novosibirsk Regional Federation of Trade
Unions.
Un = 1, if the enterprise union organization belongs to a powerful union,
0 — otherwise;
Dogovor = 1, if the enterprise union organization has concluded a labor
contract, 0 — otherwise.
Source of information: Department of Finance and Tax Policy of
Novosibirsk Regional Administration.
Gos = 1, if the enterprise used state support in the year t, 0 — other-
wise.
Calculation of alternative monthly wage — see Appendix D#.
Ln awage — logarithm of alternative average monthly wage.
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APPENDIX B
Table B1. Labor Demand Model: IV Estimates of the Basic Employment
Equation.
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
lnLt–1 0.809*
(0.017)
0.830*
(0.039)
0.758*
(0.027)
0.838*
(0.050)
lnqt 0.176*
(0.015)
0.271*
(0.029)
0.166*
(0.021)
0.210*
(0.029)
lnqt–1 –0.058*
(0.015)
–0.142*
(0.029)
–0.018
(0.021)
–0.094*
(0.034)
LREq 0.619*
(0.041)
0.759*
(0.072)
0.614
(0.049)
0.721
(0.088)
lnwaget –0.165*
 (0.020)
–0.345*
 (0.031)
–0.167*
(0.042)
–0.337*
(0.032)
lnwaget–1 0.078*
(0.027)
0.213*
(0.036)
0.022
(0.036)
0.223*
(0.039)
LREwage –0.456*
(0.108)
–0.780*
(0.133)
–0.601
(0.118)
–0.704
(0.150)
Un 0.049**
(0.021)
–0.013
(0.030)
0.090*
(0.029)
0.018
(0.036)
K 0.146
(0.194)
–0.018
(0.023)
0.291
(0.192)
–0.040
(0.068)
Svpr 0.012
(0.023)
–0.026
(0.033)
–0.013
(0.033)
0.002
(0.033)
Gos 0.012
(0.034)
–0.023
(0.049)
–0.011
(0.043)
–0.036
(0.046)
G100 0.212*
(0.036)
–0.003
(0.067)
–0.048
(0.140)
–0.054
(0.116)
G50 – 75 –0.051
(0.059)
0.042
(0.080)
–0.135*
(0.081)
0.037
(0.089)
Zol –0.086***
(0.049)
0.009
(0.068)
–0.072
(0.068)
0.043
(0.080)
Man –0.060**
(0.028)
–0.075***
(0.041)
–0.099*
(0.038)
–0.054
(0.045)
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Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Out 0.051
(0.035)
0.057
(0.049)
0.059
(0.047)
0.092***
(0.055)
V1 –0.022
(0.036)
–0.056
(0.041)
–0.036
(0.050)
–0.059
(0.045)
V3 –0.157**
(0.071)
–0.080
(0.094)
–0.176***
(0.085)
–0.115
(0.097)
V4 –0.038
(0.027)
–0.035
(0.038)
–0.046
(0.033)
–0.024
(0.042)
Tax –0.087*
(0.031)
–0.085**
(0.042)
Constant –0.189***
(0.106)
–0.419*
(0.153)
–0.062
(0.199)
–0.268
(0.186)
P1 – P7 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg1 – Reg4 Yes Yes Yes Yes
χ2 First
Difference
69.06*
(0.000)
503.25*
(0.000)
89.23*
(0.000)
400.49*
(0.000)
χ2 Exogeneity 299.07*
(0.000)
194.49*
(0.000)
300.43*
(0.000)
42.01**
(0.024)
Tests F = 830.59
Prob > F = 0
F = 413.82
Prob > F = 0
F = 399.90
Prob > F = 0
F = 311.97
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9648 0.9588 0.9531 0.9576
Number
of Observations 829 463 534 357
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
We used the following instrumental variables: for the first lag of the number of employees —
the second lag of the number of employees; for the dummy "Un" — dummy "dogovor;" for
the variable "K" — the first lag of K; for the dummy "Svpr" — the size of an enterprise before
privatization (s1 – s4) and the dummies for the sector of industry (Ot1 – Ot12). See text for
precise definitions.
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Table B2. Labor Demand Model: IV Estimates of Augmented Employment
Equation.
Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
lnLt–1 0.801*
(0.018)
0.835*
(0.044)
0.752*
(0.028)
0.828*
(0.052)
lnqt 0.176*
(0.015)
0.248*
(0.030)
0.163*
(0.021)
0.211
(0.029)
lnqt–1 –0.060*
(0.015)
–0.125*
(0.029)
–0.018
(0.021)
–0.095
(0.034)
LREq 0.586*
(0.044)
0.747*
(0.085)
0.586
(0.052)
0.674
(0.087)
lnwaget –0.165*
(0.021)
–0.331*
(0.030)
–0.165*
(0.041)
–0.338*
(0.032)
lnwaget–1 0.085*
(0.027)
0.209*
(0.036)
0.022
(0.036)
0.224*
(0.039)
LREwage –0.404*
(0.108)
–0.740*
(0.141)
–0.576
(0.115)
–0.666
(0.142)
Un 0.051**
(0.021)
–0.007
(0.030)
0.096*
(0.029)
0.026
(0.036)
K 0.099
(0.193)
–0.029
(0.022)
0.281
(0.195)
–0.049*
(0.066)
Svpr 0.021
(0.024)
–0.018
(0.032)
–0.005
(0.033)
0.012
(0.034)
Gos 0.021
(0.034)
–0.015
(0.048)
–0.010
(0.043)
–0.029
(0.047)
G100 0.206*
(0.037)
–0.003
(0.065)
–0.084
(0.144)
–0.054
(0.116)
G50 – 75 –0.063
(0.060)
0.037
(0.068)
–0.149***
(0.083)
0.027
(0.089)
Zol –0.081***
(0.048)
0.010
(0.066)
–0.075
(0.068)
0.041
(0.080)
Man –0.064**
(0.029)
–0.067***
(0.040)
–0.107*
(0.038)
–0.057
(0.045)
Out 0.055
(0.035)
0.054
(0.048)
0.066
(0.047)
0.098***
(0.055)
V1 –0.024
(0.036)
–0.061
(0.039)
–0.046
(0.049)
–0.064
(0.045)
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Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
V3 –0.168**
(0.072)
–0.078
(0.092)
–0.185**
(0.085)
–0.120
(0.096)
V4 –0.040
(0.026)
–0.033
(0.037)
–0.048
(0.033)
–0.023
(0.042)
Unemplt –0.163
(0.154)
–0.163
(0.210)
–0.281
(0.268)
–0.288
(0.236)
Assets91 0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0001
(0.00013)
0.00013
(0.00012)
0.00012
(0.00013)
Tax –0.096*
(0.030)
–0.085**
(0.042)
Constant –0.094
(0.114)
–0.355**
(0.152)
0.041
(0.210)
–0.190
(0.190)
P1 – P7 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg1 – Reg4 Yes Yes Yes Yes
χ2 First
Difference
59.84*
(0.001)
286.05*
(0.000)
101.60*
(0.000)
452.18
(0.000)
χ2 Exogeneity 467.63*
(0.000)
54.96*
(0.002)
144.68*
(0.000)
172.17
(0.000)
Tests F = 738.48
Prob > F = 0
F = 400.23
Prob > F = 0
F = 374.89
Prob > F = 0
F = 291.29
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9640 0.9619 0.9534 0.9579
Number
of Observations 811 445 534 357
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
We used the following instrumental variables: for the first lag of the number of employees —
the second lag of the number of employees; for the dummy "Un" — dummy "dogovor;" for
the variable "K" — the first lag of K; for the dummy "Svpr" — the size of an enterprise before
privatization (s1 – s4) and the dummies for the sector of industry (Ot1 – Ot12). See text for
precise definitions.
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Table B3. Effective bargaining model: IV Estimates of Employment Equation.
Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
lnqt 0.699*
(0.028)
0.700*
(0.033)
0.699*
(0.028)
0.636*
(0.026)
lnwaget –0.943*
(0.080)
–0.843*
(0.084)
–10.048*
(0.098)
–0.701*
(0.062)
lnawaget 0.065
(0.121)
–0.086
(0.080)
0.158
(0.101)
–0.038
(0.061)
σ 0.878*
(0.071)
0.930
(0.084)
0.889
(0.065)
0.739
(0.063)
ξ –0.074
(0.141)
0.093
(0.083)
–0.178
(0.119)
0.051
(0.080)
Un 0.215*
(0.064)
0.092
(0.079)
0.267*
(0.059)
0.259*
(0.058)
K 20.444*
(0.753)
0.186*
(0.058)
0.301
(0.511)
0.371*
(0.124)
Svpr –0.109
(0.077)
–0.026
(0.089)
–0.048
(0.071)
0.030
(0.062)
Gos 0.046
(0.119)
0.304**
(0.125)
0.058
(0.094)
0.195**
(0.085)
G100 0.420*
(0.112)
0.175
(0.177)
–0.273
(0.289)
0.008
(0.220)
G50 – 75 –0.524*
(0.184)
–0.047
(0.212)
–0.903*
(0.160)
–0.307***
(0.165)
Zol 0.046
(0.150)
–0.021
(0.179)
–0.080
(0.139)
0.092
(0.147)
Man –0.298*
(0.088)
–0.271*
(0.102)
–0.249*
(0.077)
–0.234*
(0.080)
Out 0.159***
(0.110)
0.071
(0.132)
0.249**
(0.096)
0.248**
(0.103)
V1 –0.117
(0.118)
0.007
(0.107)
0.084*
(0.111)
–0.047
(0.085)
V3 –0.438***
(0.225)
–0.279
(0.252)
–0.534*
(0.173)
–0.446**
(0.181)
V4 –0.131
(0.084)
–0.108
(0.100)
–0.053
(0.069)
–0.090
(0.078)
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Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
tax 0.091
(0.097)
–0.097
(0.090)
Constant –30.075*
(0.828)
–10.704*
(0.614)
–20.768*
(0.740)
–0.974***
(0.500)
P1 – P7 Yes Yes Yes Yes
χ2 First
Difference
4130.45*
(0.000)
760.34*
(0.000)
2120.92*
(0.000)
2400.02*
(0.000)
χ2 Exogeneity 350.80**
(0.032)
450.27*
(0.001)
2640.51*
(0.000)
120.71
(0.889)
Tests F = 97.95
Prob > F = 0
F = 71.29
Prob > F = 0
F = 106.17
Prob > F = 0
F = 106.05
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.6474 0.7117 0.7963 0.8488
Number
of Observations 864 465 534 357
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
We used the following instrumental variables: for the variable "a wage" — region dummies
(Reg – Reg4); for the dummy "Un" — dummy "dogovor;" for the variable "K" — the first lag
of K; for the dummy "Svpr" — the size of an enterprise before privatization (s1 – s4) and the
dummies for the sector of industry (Ot1 – Ot12). See text for precise definitions.
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Table B4. IV Estimates of Wage Equation.
Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
LnWaget–1 0.872*
(0.078)
0.719*
(0.070)
0.705*
(0.103)
0.736*
(0.077)
Lnqlt 0.619*
(0.058)
0.856*
(0.221)
0.692*
(0.063)
0.672*
(0.202)
Lnqlt–1 –0.459*
(0.046)
–0.652*
(0.187)
–0.396*
(0.050)
–0.495*
(0.172)
LREwage 1.245***
(0.487)
0.726
(0.129)
0.999
(0.197)
0.669*
(0.142)
Mon 0.041
(0.056)
0.050
(0.067)
0.030
(0.066)
0.061
(0.071)
M 0.064**
(0.028)
0.037*
(0.013)
0.318*
(0.076)
0.025**
(0.012)
Unempl 0.322
(0.305)
–0.347
(0.384)
0.541
(0.429)
–0.324
(0.415)
Un –0.020
(0.039)
–0.031
(0.054)
0.004
(0.049)
–0.011
(0.058)
Svpr –0.056
(0.042)
–0.025
(0.056)
0.006
(0.053)
–0.018
(0.056)
Gos 0.133**
(0.061)
0.010
(0.078)
0.133***
(0.071)
–0.016
(0.074)
G100 0.026
(0.074)
0.039
(0.124)
–0.086
(0.244)
–0.029
(0.181)
G50 – 75 –0.136
(0.115)
0.099
(0.145)
–0.199
(0.135)
0.097
(0.150)
Zol –0.019
(0.092)
0.055
(0.117)
0.018
(0.114)
0.191
(0.138)
Man –0.016
(0.053)
–0.009
(0.069)
0.015
(0.063)
0.025
(0.073)
Out –0.167**
(0.066)
–0.008
(0.084)
–0.120
(0.076)
–0.010
(0.090)
V1 0.029
(0.057)
–0.015
(0.073)
0.077
(0.067)
0.018
(0.073)
V3 0.159
(0.133)
0.104
(0.158)
0.078
(0.140)
0.109
(0.153)
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Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
V4 0.024
(0.049)
0.037
(0.066)
0.028
(0.055)
0.069
(0.069)
Tax –0.327*
(0.049)
–0.288*
(0.063)
Constant –0.121
(0.224)
–0.593*
(0.222)
–0.331
(0.355)
–0.564**
(0.256)
P1 – P7 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg1 – Reg4 Yes Yes Yes Yes
χ2 First
Difference
1841.03*
(0.00)
87.67*
(0.000)
869.94*
(0.000)
51.34*
(0.002)
χ2 Exogeneity 63.15*
(0.000)
9.47
(0.999)
41.83**
(0.045)
9.23
(0.999)
Tests F = 70.86
Prob > F = 0
F = 56.26
Prob > F = 0
F = 50.75
Prob > F = 0
F = 50.70
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.7096 0.7559 0.7243 0.7936
Number
of Observations 797 461 534 357
Dependent Variable is the Logarithm of Average Monthly Wage, Ln Waget t (standard errors
are in parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
We used the following instrumental variables: for the first lag of the wages — the second lag
of wages; for the first lag of labor productivity — the second lag of labor productivity; for vari-
able "Un" — dummy "dogovor;" for the variable "K" — the first lag of K; for the dummy
"Svpr" — the size of an enterprise before privatization (s1-s4) and the dummies for the sector
of industry (Ot1 – Ot12). See text for precise definitions.
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Table B5. Labor Demand Model: IV Estimates of Basic Employment Equation.
Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Labor Contract
lnLt–1 0.724*
(0.043)
0.762*
(0.076)
0.694*
(0.049)
0.800*
(0.076)
lnqt 0.257*
(0.041)
0.340*
(0.077)
0.275*
(0.050)
0.365*
(0.096)
lnqt–1 –0.069
(0.043)
–0.139
(0.084)
–0.087***
(0.049)
–0.195**
(0.094)
LREq 0.682*
(0.061)
0.846*
(0.093)
0.614*
(0.064)
0.852*
(0.114)
lnwaget –0.422*
(0.048)
–0.522*
(0.069)
–0.417*
(0.052)
–0.503*
(0.065)
lnwaget–1 0.250*
(0.065)
0.308*
(0.086)
0.214*
(0.074)
0.348*
(0.081)
LREwage –0.624*
(0.149)
–0.901*
(0.189)
–0.665*
(0.148)
–0.775*
(0.237)
Tests F = 268.13
Prob > F = 0
F = 164.12
Prob > F = 0
F = 165.68
Prob > F = 0
F = 133.55
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9505 0.9529 0.9359 0.9508
Number
of Observations 240 111 184 92
No Labor Contract
lnLt–1 0.812*
(0.031)
0.908*
(0.062)
0.779*
(0.044)
0.877*
(0.094)
lnqt 0.198*
(0.027)
0.199*
(0.043)
0.189*
(0.036)
0.195*
(0.054)
lnqt–1 –0.081**
(0.031)
–0.127**
(0.052)
–0.036
(0.035)
–0.122***
(0.068)
LREq 0.622*
(0.053)
0.783*
(0.264)
0.692*(0.10 0.597**
(0.238)
lnwaget 0.097
(0.063)
–0.305*
(0.069)
0.125
(0.095)
–0.422*
(0.087)
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Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
No Labor Contract
lnwaget–1 –0.166*
(0.060)
0.284*
(0.083)
–0.287*
(0.078)
0.379*
(0.102)
LREwage –0.362**
(0.179)
–0.231
(0.707)
–0.732*
(0.196)
–0.355
(0.481)
Tests F = 189.63
Prob > F = 0
F = 109.15
Prob > F = 0
F = 121.84
Prob > F = 0
F = 58.39
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9150 0.9245 0.9176 0.8991
Number
of Observations
297 118 174 86
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B6. Labor Demand Model: IV Estimates of Augmented Employment
Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Labor Contract
lnLt–1 0.722*
(0.045)
0.755*
(0.077)
0.696*
(0.049)
0.818*
(0.076)
lnqt 0.262*
(0.044)
0.383*
(0.082)
0.276*
(0.053)
0.358*
(0.100)
lnqt–1 –0.066
(0.044)
–0.166**
(0.082)
–0.087***
(0.050)
–0.202**
(0.097)
LREq 0.707*
(0.073)
0.885*
(0.103)
0.623*
(0.073)
0.856*
(0.149)
lnwaget –0.427*
(0.049)
–0.537*
(0.067)
–0.419*
(0.053)
–0.505*
(0.066)
lnwaget–1 0.254*
(0.067)
0.307*
(0.085)
0.215*
(0.074)
0.366*
(0.083)
LREwage –0.622*
(0.158)
–0.937*
(0.188)
–0.67*
(0.149)
–0.765*
(0.267)
Unemplt –0.273
(0.433)
–0.182
(0.674)
–0.052
(0.512)
0.514
(0.789)
Assets91 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
–0.000
(0.000)
–0.000
(0.000)
Tests F = 216.38
Prob > F = 0
F = 155.98
Prob > F = 0
F =145.54
Prob > F = 0
F = 114.51
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9471 0.9587 0.9351 0.9583
Number
of Observations 232 106 184 92
No Labor contract
lnLt–1 0.762*
(0.040)
0.835*
(0.088)
0.729*
(0.049)
0.827*
(0.109)
lnqt 0.203*
(0.030)
0.207*
(0.046)
0.186*
(0.036)
0.192*
(0.055)
lnqt–1 –0.076**
(0.034)
–0.102***
(0.059)
–0.033
(0.034)
–0.103
(0.072)
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Unbalanced Panel of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
No Labor Contract
LREq 0.536*
(0.072)
0.636*
(0.148)
0.564*
(0.092)
0.514*
(0.181)
lnwaget 0.153**
(0.070)
–0.304*
(0.073)
0.148
(0.096)
–0.423*
(0.088)
lnwaget–1 –0.200*
(0.067)
0.246*
(0.093)
–0.310*
(0.080)
0.359*
(0.105)
LREwage –0.244
(0.162)
–0.348
(0.305)
–0.597*
(0.167)
–0.368
(0.339)
Unemplt –0.196
(0.303)
–0.097
(0.575)
–0.373
(0.380)
–0.189
(0.741)
Assets91 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.004
(0.004)
Tests F = 138.97
Prob > F = 0
F = 83.14
Prob > F = 0
F = 108.85
Prob > F = 0
F = 50.39
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.8977 0.9172 0.9177 0.8985
Number
of Observations 292 114 174 86
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B7. Effective bargaining model: IV Estimates of Employment Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Labor Contract
lnwaget –1.065*
(0.111)
–0.910*
(0.123)
–0.906*
(0.117)
–0.709*
(0.117)
lnawaget 0.001
(0.128)
–0.122
(0.131)
–0.086
(0.132)
–0.209***
(0.120)
σ 1.064*
(0.082)
1.032*
(0.122)
0.992*
(0.086)
0.918*
(0.113)
ξ –0.001
(0.120)
0.118
(0.120)
0.087
(0.129)
0.228***
(0.119)
Tests F = 110.74
Prob > F = 0
F = 74.97
Prob > F = 0
F = 75.73
Prob > F = 0
F = 68.5
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.8313 0.8182 0.8062 0.8380
Number
of Observations 242 113 184 92
No Labor Contract
lnwaget –0.883*
(0.149)
–0.706*
(0.099)
–0.976*
(0.121)
–0.635*
(0.094)
lnawaget 0.115
(0.166)
–0.041
(0.130)
0.386*
(0.143)
0.069
(0.116)
σ 0.768*
(0.114)
0.747*
(0.125)
0.590*
(0.115)
0.566*
(0.118)
ξ –0.150
(0.228)
0.055
(0.167)
–0.653**
(0.332)
–0.121
(0.222)
Tests F = 26.92
Prob > F = 0
F = 38.36
Prob > F = 0
F = 33.36
Prob > F = 0
F = 34.6
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.2305 0.6794 0.6040 0.7412
Number
of Observations 315 118 174 86
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B8. IV Estimates of Wage Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Labor Contract
LnWaget–1 0.826*
(0.107)
0.712*
(0.074)
0.662*
(0.124)
0.704*
(0.090)
Lnqlt 0.671*
(0.073)
0.556**
(0.216)
0.740*
(0.084)
0.404***
(0.244)
Lnqlt–1 –0.471*
(0.069)
–0.385**
(0.185)
–0.456*
(0.076)
–0.247
(0.216)
LREwage 1.147*
(0.401)
0.594*
(0.134)
0.842*
(0.146)
0.529*
(0.159)
Tests F = 64.66
Prob > F = 0
F = 85.85
Prob > F = 0
F = 47.55
Prob > F = 0
F = 63.01
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.7575 0.8470 0.7412 0.8303
Number
of Observations 359 222 274 184
No Labor Contract
LnWaget–1 0.911*
(0.091)
0.829*
(0.093)
0.865*
(0.126)
0.890*
(0.122)
Lnqlt 0.473*
(0.074)
0.541*
(0.205)
0.535*
(0.083)
0.264
(0.239)
Lnqlt–1 –0.374*
(0.057)
–0.441*
(0.168)
–0.336*
(0.062)
–0.232
(0.194)
LREwage 1.127
(0.727)
0.583*
(0.038)
1.473
(1.55)
0.285
(0.593)
Tests F = 56.62
Prob > F = 0
F = 58.9
Prob > F = 0
F = 41.5
Prob > F = 0
F = 41.85
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.6989 0.7760 0.7199 0.7708
Number
of Observations 438 239 260 173
Dependent variable is the logarithm of average monthly wage, Ln Waget (standard errors are
in parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B9. Labor Demand Model: IV Estimates of Augmented Employment
Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panels of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
State Support
lnLt–1 0.551*
(0.089)
1.006*
(0.176)
0.576*
(0.107)
1.059*
(0.158)
lnqt 0.318*
(0.069)
0.704*
(0.174)
0.245*
(0.063)
0.679*
(0.159)
lnqt–1 0.073
(0.084)
–0.650*
(0.217)
0.086
(0.075)
–0.626*
(0.200)
LREq 0.872*
(0.072)
–8.698
(264.596)
0.783*
(0.207)
–0.876
(4.186)
lnwaget 0.121
(0.286)
–0.742*
(0.172)
–0.052
(0.317)
–0.667*
(0.152)
lnwaget–1 –0.556**
(0.244)
0.683*
(0.187)
–0.378
(0.236)
0.660*
(0.170)
LREwage –0.970*
(0.145)
9.374
(283.775)
–1.015*
(0.127)
0.128
(2.474)
Tests F = 94.45
Prob > F = 0
F = 46.16
Prob > F = 0
F = 118.03
Prob > F = 0
F = 58.27
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9344 0.9300 0.9589 0.9538
Number
of Observations 97 46 76 38
No State Support
lnLt–1 0.833*
(0.025)
0.786*
(0.050)
0.772*
(0.035)
0.805*
(0.055)
lnqt 0.210*
(0.023)
0.226*
(0.044)
0.250*
(0.034)
0.195*
(0.042)
lnqt–1 –0.114*
(0.026)
–0.063
(0.043)
–0.102*
(0.034)
–0.056
(0.049)
LREq 0.574*
(0.068)
0.762*
(0.072)
0.650*
(0.070)
0.713*
(0.082)
lnwaget –0.224*
(0.035)
–0.357*
(0.049)
–0.297*
(0.050)
–0.395*
(0.052)
lnwaget–1 0.175*
(0.041)
0.195*
(0.060)
0.160*
(0.056)
0.255*
(0.063)
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Unbalanced Panels of Firms Unbalanced Panels of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
No State Support
LREwage –0.291
(0.179)
–0.757*
(0.164)
–0.603*
(0.172)
–0.716*
(0.187)
Tests F = 442.78
Prob > F = 0
F = 255.71
Prob > F = 0
F = 217.55
Prob > F = 0
F = 194.72
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9447 0.9502 0.9263 0.9489
Number
of Observations 440 183 282 140
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
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Table B10. Labor Demand Model: IV Estimates of Augmented Employment
Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
State Support
lnLt–1 0.576*
(0.088)
1.269*
(0.163)
0.518*
(0.109)
1.341*
(0.153)
lnqt 0.309*
(0.053)
0.689*
(0.136)
0.256*
(0.057)
0.823*
(0.149)
lnqt–1 0.054
(0.063)
–0.723*
(0.183)
0.099
(0.069)
–0.873*
(0.186)
LREq 0.856*
(0.081)
0.124
(0.325)
0.736*
(0.076)
0.147
(0.245)
lnwaget –0.144
(0.174)
–0.733*
(0.136)
–0.189
(0.204)
–0.757*
(0.137)
lnwaget–1 –0.303**
(0.148)
0.779*
(0.158)
–0.262
(0.157)
0.795*
(0.155)
LREwage –1.054*
(0.131)
0.172
(0.382)
–0.935**
(0.123)
–0.113
(0.317)
Unemplt –1.522**
(0.586)
1.256
(1.538)
–1.428***
(0.745)
1.788
(1.560)
Assets91 –0.000
(0.000)
–0.002**
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
–0.003*
(0.001)
Tests F =139.92
Prob > F = 0
F = 68.56
Prob > F = 0
F =126.29
Prob > F = 0
F = 66.62
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9634 0.9608 0.9660 0.9643
Number
of Observations 91 43 76 38
No State Support
lnLt–1 0.815*
(0.027)
0.743*
(0.055)
0.763*
(0.038)
0.780*
(0.057)
lnqt 0.214*
(0.024)
0.235*
(0.045)
0.249*
(0.034)
0.192*
(0.042)
lnqt–1 –0.116*
(0.026)
–0.056
(0.044)
–0.100*
(0.034)
–0.048
(0.053)
LREq 0.529*
(0.070)
0.697*
(0.066)
0.627*
(0.077)
0.653*
(0.084)
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Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
No State Support
lnwaget –0.211*
(0.036)
–0.360*
(0.049)
–0.299*
(0.050)
–0.406*
(0.053)
lnwaget–1 0.174*
(0.042)
0.188*
(0.062)
0.161*
(0.056)
0.260*
(0.063)
LREwage –0.197
(0.172)
–0.673*
(0.142)
–0.584*
(0.171)
–0.667*
(0.166)
Unemplt 0.021
(0.233)
0.121
(0.390)
0.164
(0.378)
0.402
(0.453)
Assets91 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Tests F = 380.77
Prob > F = 0
F = 224.14
Prob > F = 0
F = 192.39
Prob > F = 0
F = 169.24
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9416 0.9524 0.9259 0.9490
Number
of Observations 433 177 282 140
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B11. Effective bargaining model: IV Estimates of Employment Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
State Support
lnwaget –1.240*
(0.154)
–0.712*
(0.176)
–1.120*
(0.162)
–0.734*
(0.173)
lnawaget 0.083
(0.167)
–0.270
(0.190)
0.081
(0.170)
–0.165
(0.204)
σ 1.157*
(0.097)
0.982*
(0.183)
1.039*
(0.111)
0.899*
(0.194)
ξ –0.072
(0.147)
0.275
(0.170)
–0.078
(0.167)
0.184
(0.204)
Tests F = 62.38
Prob > F = 0
F = 30.83
Prob > F = 0
F = 45.77
Prob > F = 0
F = 28.22
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.8441 0.8162 0.8351 0.8358
Number
of Observations 99 47 76 38
No State Support
lnwaget –0.881*
(0.108)
–0.908*
(0.105)
–0.952*
(0.136)
–0.808*
(0.101)
lnawaget 0.107
(0.119)
–0.004
(0.127)
0.070
(0.146)
0.052
(0.108)
σ 0.774*
(0.080)
0.912*
(0.127)
0.881*
(0.091)
0.756*
(0.111)
ξ –0.138
(0.161)
0.004
(0.139)
–0.080
(0.170)
–0.069
(0.147)
Tests F = 98.63
Prob > F = 0
F = 69.31
Prob > F = 0
F = 70.07
Prob > F = 0
F = 68.05
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.6522 0.6980 0.6983 0.7676
Number
of Observations 458 184 282 140
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
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Table B12. IV Estimates of Wage Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
State Support
LnWaget–1 0.937***
(0.491)
0.984*
(0.153)
0.584
(0.408)
1.069*
(0.197)
Lnqlt 0.577*
(0.185)
0.643*
(0.216)
0.607*
(0.188)
0.654**
(0.251)
Lnqlt–1 –0.414**
(0.199)
–0.673*
(0.205)
–0.221
(0.154)
–0.740*
(0.233)
LREwage 2.604
(15.861)
–1.875
(24.401)
0.928**
(0.392)
1.241
(1.692)
Tests F = 14.72
Prob > F = 0
F = 22.64
Prob > F = 0
F = 11.29
Prob > F = 0
F = 18.4
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.5413 0.7754 0.5553 0.7508
Number
of Observations 146 92 114 76
No State Support
LnWaget–1 0.869*
(0.076)
0.688*
(0.073)
0.711*
(0.096)
0.683*
(0.084)
Lnqlt 0.582*
(0.059)
0.785*
(0.219)
0.669*
(0.063)
0.554**
(0.242)
Lnqlt–1 –0.443*
(0.047)
–0.568*
(0.176)
–0.403*
(0.050)
–0.356***
(0.189)
LREwage 1.059*
(0.362)
0.696*
(0.111)
0.920*
(0.168)
0.626*
(0.140)
Tests F = 99.68
Prob > F = 0
F = 89.46
Prob > F = 0
F = 71.12
Prob > F = 0
F = 78.89
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.7342 0.7683 0.7490 0.8027
Number
of Observations 651 369 420 281
Dependent variable is the logarithm of average monthly wage, Ln Waget (standard errors are
in parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B13. Labor Demand Model: IV Estimates of Basic Employment Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panels of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Insider-Dominated Enterprises
lnLt–1 0.761*
(0.029)
0.740*
(0.065)
0.808*
(0.030)
0.728*
(0.070)
lnqt 0.205*
(0.019)
0.088***
(0.049)
0.159*
(0.024)
0.060
(0.050)
lnqt–1 –0.076*
(0.025)
0.047
(0.065)
–0.061**
(0.025)
–0.048
(0.218)
LREq 0.544*
(0.056)
0.519*
(0.112)
0.512*
(0.073)
0.534**
(0.234)
lnwaget –0.098**
(0.038)
–0.019
(0.088)
–0.010
(0.040)
–0.133
(0.229)
lnwaget–1 0.039
(0.042)
–0.047
(0.100)
–0.039
(0.041)
–0.317*
(0.092)
LREwage –0.249***
(0.136)
–0.255
(0.205)
–0.256
(0.156)
–0.238
(278)
Tests F = 461.73
Prob > F = 0
F = 59.5
Prob > F = 0
F = 191.10
Prob > F = 0
F = 49.47
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9719 0.9200 0.9586 0.9186
Number
of Observations 205 70 129 59
Outsider-Dominated Enterprises
lnLt–1 0.858*
(0.072)
1.002*
(0.087)
0.839*
(0.077)
1.002*
(0.108)
lnqt 0.103
(0.086)
0.264***
(0.139)
0.103
(0.093)
0.264***
(0.149)
lnqt–1 –0.019
(0.094)
–0.249**
(0.115)
–0.001
(0.010)
–0.246***
(0.119)
LREq 0.595*
(0.223)
–7.328
(349.611)
0.634*
(0.210)
–8.017
(421.118)
lnwaget –0.042
(0.095)
–0.059
(0.126)
–0.024
(0.099)
–0.046
(0.138)
lnwaget–1 –0.069
(0.136)
0.059
(0.102)
–0.127
(0.142)
0.037
(0.107)
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Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panels of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Outsider-Dominated Enterprises
LREwage –0.781**
(0.398)
0.128
(47.070)
–0.936**
(0.376)
3.836
(219.527)
Tests F = 100.27
Prob > F = 0
F = 115.44
Prob > F = 0
F = 91.71
Prob > F = 0
F = 89.48
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9496 0.9747 0.9457 0.9712
Number
of Observations 76 34 70 30
Manager-Dominated Enterprises
lnLt–1 0.739*
(0.061)
0.877*
(0.085)
0.654*
(0.083)
0.914*
(0.085)
lnqt 0.136*
(0.031)
0.181*
(0.055)
0.112**
(0.043)
0.175**
(0.072)
lnqt–1 –0.086**
(0.037)
–0.101**
(0.048)
–0.008
(0.046)
–0.102
(0.063)
LREq 0.194**
(0.088)
0.651**
(0.251)
0.300*
(0.105)
0.848
(0.550)
lnwaget –0.057
(0.051)
–0.127**
(0.054)
–0.125
(0.112)
–0.197**
(0.075)
lnwaget–1 0.086
(0.054)
0.071
(0.062)
0.041
(0.088)
0.144***
(0.072)
LREwage 0.113
(0.212)
–0.448
(0.297)
0.242
(0.218)
–0.573
(0.501)
Tests F = 50.79
Prob F = 0
F = 86.08
Prob > F = 0
F = 17.78
Prob > F = 0
F = 72.65
Pro F = 0
Adj R2 0.8572 0.9560 0.7632 0.9554
Number
of Observations 130 59 77 49
State Enterprises
lnLt–1 0.716*
(0.060)
0.781*
(0.126)
0.412*
(0.102)
0.980*
(0.214)
lnqt 0.283*
(0.086)
0.532*
(0.168)
0.452*
(0.099)
0.330
(0.243)
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Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panels of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
State Enterprises
lnqt–1 –0.060
(0.085)
–0.336***
(0.181)
0.052
(0.106)
–0.295
(0.360)
LREq 0.781*
(0.097)
0.895*
(0.160)
0.858*
(0.062)
0.122
(7.634)
lnwaget –0.491*
(0.097)
–0.903*
(0.128)
–0.643*
(0.111)
–0.841*
(0.138)
lnwaget–1 0.175***
(0.102)
0.613*
(0.151)
–0.035
(0.127)
0.837*
(0.250)
LREwage –1.112*
(0.211)
–1.322*
(0.370)
–1.154*
(0.147)
–0.199
(9.989)
Tests F = 95.03
Prob > F = 0
F = 72.12
Prob > F = 0
F = 52.21
Prob > F = 0
F = 38.8
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9286 0.9422 0.9165 0.9354
Number
of Observations 110 59 72 35
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B14. Labor Demand Model: IV Estimates of Augmented Employment
Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Insider-Dominated Enterprises
lnLt–1 0.865*
(0.030)
0.769*
(0.078)
0.765*
(0.039)
0.775*
(0.071)
lnqt 0.177*
(0.017)
0.067
(0.052)
0.151*
(0.024)
0.030
(0.052)
lnqt–1 –0.063*
(0.002)
0.066
(0.070)
–0.057**
(0.024)
0.113***
(0.067)
LREq 0.837*
(0.127)
0.576*
(0.161)
0.398*
(0.073)
0.635*
(0.149)
lnwaget –0.060***
(0.034)
–0.032
(0.090)
–0.015
(0.040)
0.029
(0.088)
lnwaget–1 0.012
(0.037)
–0.045
(0.102)
–0.032
(0.040)
–0.114
(0.098)
LREwage –0.354***
(0.207)
–0.334
(0.456)
–0.199
(0.131)
–0.382
(0.248)
Unemplt –0.516*
(0.189)
0.518
(0.605)
–0.275
(0.260)
0.952
(0.659)
Assets91 –0.005*
(0.001)
–0.001
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.002)
–0.002
(0.001)
Tests F = 527.36
Prob > F = 0
F = 51.11
Prob > F = 0
F = 171.49
Prob > F = 0
F = 45.58
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9782 0.9188 0.9591 0.9214
Number
of Observations 205 70 129 59
Outsider-Dominated Enterprises
lnLt–1 0.844*
(0.075)
1.014*
(0.077)
0.811*
(0.081)
1.037*
(0.099)
lnqt 0.080
(0.091)
0.241***
(0.125)
0.076
(0.097)
0.237
(0.140)
lnqt–1 –0.007
(0.097)
–0.227**
(0.103)
0.016
(0.102)
–0.231***
(0.113)
LREq 0.467***
(0.270)
–0.979
(10.108)
0.484**
(0.236)
–0.181
(2.678)
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Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Outsider-Dominated Enterprises
lnwaget –0.032
(0.097)
–0.010
(0.115)
–0.0129
(0.101)
0.031
(0.132)
lnwaget–1 –0.075
(0.140)
–0.006
(0.098)
–0.142
(0.146)
–0.035
(0.107)
LREwage 0.687***
(0.400)
1.140
(11.038)
–0.820**
(0.350)
0.095
(2.731)
Unemplt –0.593
(0.937)
–1.257
(0.814)
–0.747
(0.940)
–1.600
(0.939)
Assets91 0.000
(0.000)
–0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
–0.000
(0.000)
Tests F = 84.44
Prob > F = 0
F = 110.21
Prob > F = 0
F = 77.61
Prob > F = 0
F = 83.96
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9475 0.9774 0.9442 0.9739
Number
of Observations 76 34 70 30
Manager-Dominated Enterprises
lnLt–1 0.698*
(0.062)
0.881*
(0.086)
0.636*
(0.082)
0.928*
(0.088)
lnqt 0.125*
(0.031)
0.177*
(0.056)
0.094**
(0.042)
0.183**
(0.074)
lnqt–1 –0.068***
(0.037)
–0.099**
(0.051)
0.008
(0.046)
–0.111***
(0.065)
LREq 0.187**
(0.075)
0.656**
(0.268)
0.524***
(0.307)
0.999
(0.852)
lnwaget –0.048
(0.050)
–0.127**
(0.055)
–0.090
(0.086)
–0.200**
(0.078)
lnwaget–1 0.059
(0.054)
0.073
(0.064)
–0.006
(0.086)
0.155**
(0.075)
LREwage 0.035
(0.234)
–0.452
(0.315)
0.265
(0.200)
–0.622
(0.640)
Unemplt –0.440
(0.310)
0.250
(0.406)
–0.663
(0.503)
0.238
(0.416)
Assets91 0.006**
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
0.006**
(0.003)
–0.002
(0.003)
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Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Manager-Dominated Enterprises
Tests F = 47.08
Prob > F = 0
F = 72.89
Prob > F = 0
F = 17.16
Prob > F = 0
F = 61.33
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.8627 0.9545 0.7785 0.9535
Number
of Observations 130 59 77 49
State Enterprises
lnLt–1 0.584*
(0.080)
0.916*
(0.186)
0.334*
(0.110)
1.081*
(0.250)
lnqt 0.317*
(0.094)
0.488**
(0.191)
0.440*
(0.097)
0.347
(0.252)
lnqt–1 –0.067
(0.090)
–0.361
(0.218)
0.047
(0.105)
–0.342
(0.375)
LREq 0.601*
(0.106)
1.522
(2.031)
0.732*
(0.080)
–0.070
(2.512)
lnwaget –0.542*
(0.101)
–0.926*
(0.132)
–0.665*
(0.105)
–0.882*
(0.158)
lnwaget–1 0.181
(0.111)
0.755*
(0.195)
–0.008
(0.127)
0.929*
(0.279)
LREwage –0.868*
(0.214)
–2.035
(2.784)
–0.101
(0.139)
–0.584
(1.864)
Unemplt 0.012
(0.946)
0.266
(1.358)
–0.332
(1.208)
–0.0100
(2.197)
Assets91 0.004**
(0.002)
–0.002
(0.002)
0.004***
(0.002)
–0.003
(0.003)
Tests F = 60.22
Prob > F = 0
F = 69.97
Prob > F = 0
F = 48.43
Prob > F = 0
F = 31.64
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.9133 0.9561 0.9200 0.9311
Number
of Observations 97 50 72 35
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B15. Effective bargaining model: IV Estimates of Employment Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Insider-Dominated Enterprises
lnwaget –1.044*
(0.137)
–0.549*
(0.138)
–0.940*
(0.140)
–0.535*
(0.146)
lnawaget 0.331**
(0.129)
0.119
(0.138)
0.428*
(0.139)
0.140
(0.148)
σ 0.713*
(0.114)
0.430**
(0.170)
0.511*
(0.124)
0.394**
(0.185)
ξ –0.464**
(0.219)
–0.277
(0.398)
–0.837**
(0.404)
–0.356
(0.499)
Tests F = 60.49
Prob > F = 0
F = 13.32
Prob > F = 0
F = 16.90
Prob > F = 0
F = 10.17
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.6754 0.5234 0.4361 0.4719
Number
of Observations 210 70 129 59
Outsider-Dominated Enterprises
lnwaget –0.461*
(0.172)
–0.839*
(0.257)
–0.356**
(0.153)
–0.741*
(0.209)
lnawaget –0.482**
(0.240)
–0.010
(0.252)
–0.536**
(0.209)
–0.200
(0.218)
σ 0.943*
(0.157)
0.939*
(0.185)
0.892*
(0.139)
0.213
(0.219)
ξ 0.511**
(0.204)
0.106
(0.262)
0.601*
(0.184)
0.941*
(0.158)
Tests F = 22.66
Prob > F = 0
F = 19.02
Prob > F = 0
F = 25.11
Prob > F = 0
F = 20.38
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.7043 0.7860 0.7570 0.8190
Number
of Observations 79 34 70 30
Manager-Dominated Enterprises
lnwaget –0.290**
(0.117)
–0.347*
(0.079)
–0.860*
(0.221)
–0.365*
(0.089)
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Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Manager-Dominated Enterprises
lnawaget 0.024
(0.124)
0.068
(0.116)
0.405**
(0.180)
0.076
(0.113)
σ 0.265*
(0.089)
0.280**
(0.138)
0.455*
(0.153)
0.289**
(0.146)
ξ 0.092
(0.481)
–0.242
(0.515)
–0.890**
(0.526)
–0.263
(0.503)
Tests F = 24.60
Prob > F = 0
F = 23.66
Prob > F = 0
F = 5.81
Prob > F = 0
F = 19.55
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.6290 0.7466 0.2028 0.7487
Number
of Observations 136 59 77 49
State Enterprises
lnwaget –1.173*
(0.136)
–1.135*
(0.146)
–1.061*
(0.123)
–0.989*
(0.180)
lnawaget 0.027
(0.186)
–0.204
(0.222)
0.028
(0.167)
0.057
(0.253)
σ 1.146*
(0.123)
1.339*
(0.200)
1.003*
(0.135)
0.932*
(0.262)
ξ –0.023
(0.164)
0.152
(0.149)
–0.028
(0.164)
–0.061
(0.285)
Tests F = 53.61
Prob > F = 0
F = 45.98
Prob > F = 0
F = 52.36
Prob > F = 0
F = 26.12
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.8174 0.8421 0.8766 0.8464
Number
of Observations 115 61 72 35
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt (standard errors are in
parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Table B16. IV Estimates of Wage Equation.
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Insider-Dominated Enterprises
LnWaget–1 1.027*
(0.147)
0.772*
(0.119)
1.031*
(0.164)
0.946*
(0.237)
Lnqlt 0.593*
(0.115)
0.210
(0.611)
0.603*
(0.109)
–0.339
(0.839)
Lnqlt–1 –0.509*
(0.115)
–0.116
(0.461)
–0.461*
(0.108)
0.209
(0.552)
LREwage –3.139
(19.886)
0.412
(0.608)
–4.537
(26.174)
–2.402
(15.494)
Tests F = 41.72
Prob > F = 0
F = 31.31
Prob > F = 0
F = 33.83
Prob > F = 0
F = 17.05
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.6618 0.7512 0.7125 0.6289
Number
of Observations 308 144 194 119
Outsider-Dominated Enterprises
LnWaget–1 0.904*
(0.170)
0.647*
(0.105)
0.809*
(0.190)
0.641*
(0.114)
Lnqlt 0.899*
(0.134)
0.417
(0.367)
0.895*
(0.142)
0.263
(0.397)
Lnqlt–1 –0.773*
(0.144)
–0.135
(0.314)
–0.739*
(0.147)
0.017
(0.336)
LREwage 1.314
(1.460)
0.799*
(0.171)
0.817**
(0.378)
0.780*
(0.189)
Tests F = 24.91
Prob > F = 0
F = 40.87
Prob > F = 0
F = 23.93
Prob > F = 0
F = 34.72
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.7330 0.8663 0.7285 0.8627
Number
of Observations 116 70 107 62
Manager-Dominated Enterprises
LnWaget–1 0.955*
(0.171)
0.795*
(0.160)
0.820*
(0.196)
0.907*
(0.183)
Lnqlt 0.421*
(0.097)
0.551**
(0.250)
0.440*
(0.086)
0.467***
(0.276)
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Continued from p.71
Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
Variable
1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998 1994 – 1996 1997 – 1998
Manager-Dominated Enterprises
Lnqlt–1 –0.351*
(0.088)
–0.424***
(0.223)
–0.230**
(0.088)
–0.441
(0.268)
LREwage 1.565
(4.314)
0.621**
(0.266)
1.165
(0.806)
0.274
(0.793)
Tests F = 31.11
Prob > F = 0
F = 30.19
Prob > F = 0
F = 27.40
Prob > F = 0
F = 22.56
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.7249 0.7951 0.7936 0.7694
Number
of Observations 188 114 110 95
State Enterprises
LnWaget–1 0.818*
(0.151)
0.850*
(0.105)
0.403
(0.263)
0.951*
(0.224)
Lnqlt 0.460*
(0.115)
0.494*
(0.163)
0.745*
(0.178)
0.688*
(0.187)
Lnqlt–1 –0.306*
(0.038)
–0.425*
(0.160)
–0.240*
(0.084)
–0.663**
(0.266)
LREwage 0.850*
(0.312)
0.463***
(0.251)
0.846*
(0.139)
0.500
(1.431)
Tests F = 30.56
Prob > F = 0
F = 56.42
Prob > F = 0
F = 17.75
Prob > F = 0
F = 33.23
Prob > F = 0
Adj R2 0.7403 0.8738 0.7131 0.8730
Number
of Observations 161 119 108 71
Dependent variable is the logarithm of average monthly wage, Ln Waget (standard errors are
in parentheses).
* — significant at the 1% test level;
** — significant at the 5% test level;
*** — significant at the 10% test level.
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Appendix C
                            Table C1
Variable                |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max
   ---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------
Enterprises in 1991
Fixed and circulating assets|  307    24.29236   88.06748          1       1339
     Number of employees|     307    778.8599   1435.707         20      10250
s1 |     307    .3941368   .4894623          0          1
s2 |     307     .276873   .4481837          0          1
      s3 |     307    .1498371   .3574944          0          1
      s4 |     307    .1791531   .3841066          0          1
   svpr  |     307    .3778502   .4856415          0          1
1993
Sales (Th.Rb.)           |     315    2777.311   10516.48         10     172393
Labor (No.Employees)     |     315    651.2127   1296.761         32      12849
Av.Monthly Wage, Rb.     |     315     .057303   .0228269   .0105364   .1576087
03   .0228269   .0105364   .1576087
Ratio of Receivables
to Sales                 |     315    .2987879   .7244799          0   7.002458
Ratio of Wage Arrears
to Annual Wage Fund      |     315    .3883219   4.439269          0       78.9
Local unemployment,%     |     315    8.291778   4.691214       2.31       25.9
Owner’s Dominance
 Manager’s |     315    .1555556   .3630101          0          1
Outsider’s |     315    .1269841    .333485          0          1
 Insider’s |     315    .3396825    .474355          0          1
       State influence  |    315    .2007874   .4013802           0          1
State share
g100  |     315    .1811024   .3858633          0          1
g5075 |     315     .019685   .1391898          0          1
zol   |     315    .0275591   .1640289          0          1
State support
gos |     315    .1732283   .3791917          0          1
     monopolist |     315    .0984252   .2984768          0          1
Trade union’s activity
      un |     315    .4685039   .4999922          0          1
 dogovor |     315    .4251969   .4953489          0          1
Enterprise’s sector of industry
     ot1 |     315    .0222222   .1476401          0          1
     ot2 |     315     .031746   .1756021          0          1
     ot3 |     315    .0190476   .1369099          0          1
     ot4 |     315    .2380952   .4265954          0          1
     ot5 |     315    .0666667   .2498407          0          1
     ot6 |     315    .1301587   .3370134          0          1
     ot7 |     315    .0888889   .2850361          0          1
     ot8 |     315    .3238095   .4686728          0          1
     ot9 |     315    .0031746   .0563436          0          1
    ot10 |     315    .0253968   .1575775          0          1
    ot11 |     315    .0095238   .0972787          0          1
    ot12 |     315    .0285714   .1668637          0          1
    ot13 |     315    .0126984   .1121476          0          1
Enterprise’s Location
    reg1 |     315    .1396825   .3472089          0          1
    reg2 |     315    .1460317   .3536999          0          1
    reg3 |     315    .1365079   .3438734          0          1
    reg4 |     315    .1047619   .3067337          0          1
     reg |     315    .4730159   .5000657          0          1
Number of enterprises 315
1994
Variable                  |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max
--------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------
Sales (Th.Rb.)            |     340    7146.091   22405.76         70     365997
Labor (No.Employees)      |     340    557.0118    1171.03         32      13604
 Av.Monthly Wage, Rb.     |     340    .1983314   .0903685   .0271084    .726766
Ratio of Receivables
to Sales                  |     340     .207851   .2446277          0   1.722166
Ratio of Wage Arrears
to Annual Wage Fund       |     340    .1036771   .0699759          0   .3854167
Local unemployment,%      |     340     11.1325   7.703174       5.04      30.92
Owner’s dominance
     Manager’s  |     340    .2352941   .4248077          0          1
     outsider’s |     340    .1529412   .3604613          0          1
     insider’s  |     340    .4058824   .4917857          0          1
State influence |     340    .1696429   .3758785          0          1
State Share
g100  |     340    .1488095   .3564314          0          1
g5075 |     340    .0208333   .1430392          0          1
zol   |     340    .0267857   .1616974          0          1
State Support
     Gos        |     340    .1577381   .3650389          0          1
     monopolist |     340    .0803571   .2722507          0          1
Trade union’s activity
        un |     340    .4404762   .4971847          0          1
   dogovor |     340    .4017857   .4909903          0          1
Enterprise’s sector of industry
     ot1 |     340    .0205882   .1422106          0          1
     ot2 |     340    .0294118   .1692067          0          1
     ot3 |     340    .0176471   .1318589          0          1
     ot4 |     340    .2647059   .4418267          0          1
     ot5 |     340    .0647059   .2463687          0          1
     ot6 |     340    .1235294   .3295289          0          1
     ot7 |     340    .0911765   .2882842          0          1
     ot8 |     340    .3058824   .4614593          0          1
     ot9 |     340    .0029412   .0542326          0          1
    ot10 |     340    .0235294    .151801          0          1
    ot11 |     340    .0117647   .1079842          0          1
    ot12 |     340    .0294118   .1692067          0          1
    ot13 |     340    .0147059   .1205502          0          1
 Enterprise’s Location
    reg1 |     340    .1470588   .3546865          0          1
    reg2 |     340    .1441176   .3517266          0          1
    reg3 |     340    .1382353   .3456555          0          1
    reg4 |     340    .1058824   .3081405          0          1
     reg |     340    .4647059   .4994879          0          1
Number of enterprises 340
1995
Variable                  |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max
--------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------
Sales (Th.Rb.)            |     358     24954.9   112989.3         44    2044264
Labor (No.Employees)      |     358    493.8408   1032.996         27      13201
 Av.Monthly Wage, Rb.     |     358    .4617975    .305819   .0472441   4.415344
Ratio of Receivables
to Sales                  |     358    .1998748   .7796836   .0013369   14.46763
Ratio of Wage Arrears
to Annual Wage Fund       |     358    .1305466   .1982818          0    2.97973
Local unemployment,%      |     358    11.46229     8.3511       3.94      37.15
Owner’s dominance
     Manager’s  |     358    .2374302   .4261036          0          1
     outsider’s |     358    .1731844   .3789362          0          1
     insider’s  |     358    .3743017   .4846194          0          1
State influence |     358    .1927374   .3950007          0          1
State Share
g100  |     358    .1731844   .3789362          0          1
g5075 |     358    .0195531   .1386523          0          1
zol   |     358    .0223464   .1480142          0          1
State Support
     Gos        |     358    .1564246   .3637658          0          1
     monopolist |     358    .0726257   .2598843          0          1
Trade union’s activity
        un |     358    .4441341   .4975646          0          1
   dogovor |     358    .4050279   .4915845          0          1
Enterprise’s sector of industry
     ot1 |     358    .0223464   .1480142          0          1
     ot2 |     358    .0335196   .1802408          0          1
     ot3 |     358    .0167598   .1285498          0          1
     ot4 |     358     .273743   .4465027          0          1
     ot5 |     358    .0726257   .2598843          0          1
     ot6 |     358    .1284916   .3351048          0          1
     ot7 |     358    .0865922   .2816301          0          1
     ot8 |     358    .2765363   .4479111          0          1
     ot9 |     358    .0027933   .0528516          0          1
    ot10 |     358    .0223464   .1480142          0          1
    ot11 |     358    .0111732   .1052582          0          1
    ot12 |     358    .0363128   .1873293          0          1
    ot13 |     358    .0167598   .1285498          0          1
 Enterprise’s Location
    reg1 |     358    .1424581   .3500086          0          1
    reg2 |     358    .1368715   .3441927          0          1
    reg3 |     358    .1312849   .3381843          0          1
    reg4 |     358     .103352   .3048441          0          1
     reg |     358    .4860335   .5005044          0          1
Number of enterprises 358
 1996
Variable                  |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max
--------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------
Sales (Th.Rb.)            |     271    44161.85   177144.6        202    2738192
Labor (No.Employees)      |     271    557.8081   1040.809         26      13338
 Av.Monthly Wage, Rb.     |     271    .7688922   .4694327   .0708155   4.603935
Ratio of Receivables
to Sales                  |     271    .2201035   .3373958          0   3.222923
Ratio of Wage Arrears
to Annual Wage Fund       |     271    .1907147    .272073          0   3.042017
Local unemployment,%      |     271    .0957716     .0658978      .0325      .3065
Owner’s dominance
     Manager’s  |     271     .199262   .4001845          0          1
     outsider’s |     271    .2214022   .4159588          0          1
     insider’s  |     271     .302583   .4602262          0          1
State influence |     271    .2435424   .4300138          0          1
State Share
g100  |     271    .2214022   .4159588          0          1
g5075 |     271    .0221402   .1474117          0          1
zol   |     271    .0332103   .1795169          0          1
State Support
     Gos        |     271    .1881919   .3915885          0          1
     monopolist |     271    .0848708    .279205          0          1
Trade union’s activity
        un |     271     .498155   .5009217          0          1
   dogovor |     271    .4538745    .498789          0          1
Enterprise’s sector of industry
     ot1 |     271    .0258303   .1589222          0          1
     ot2 |     271    .0479705   .2140992          0          1
     ot3 |     271    .0184502   .1348215          0          1
     ot4 |     271    .3099631   .4633337          0          1
     ot5 |     271    .0701107   .2558059          0          1
     ot6 |     271    .1512915   .3589958          0          1
     ot7 |     271    .0922509   .2899152          0          1
     ot8 |     271    .1845018   .3886106          0          1
     ot9 |     271      .00369   .0607457          0          1
    ot10 |     271    .0147601   .1208145          0          1
    ot11 |     271    .0147601   .1208145          0          1
    ot12 |     271    .0479705   .2140992          0          1
    ot13 |     271    .0184502   .1348215          0          1
 Enterprise’s Location
    reg1 |     271    .1512915   .3589958          0          1
    reg2 |     271    .1070111   .3096993          0          1
    reg3 |     271     .095941   .2950551          0          1
    reg4 |     271    .0701107   .2558059          0          1
     reg |     271    .5756458    .495159          0          1
Number of enterprises 271
1997
Variable                  |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max
--------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------
Sales (Th.Rb.)            |     263    47583.38   204946.7         30    3184620
Labor (No.Employees)      |     263    522.5247    1007.41         23      13239
 Av.Monthly Wage, Rb.     |     263    .8934029   .4920856   .0522222   3.640853
Ratio of Receivables
to Sales                  |     263    .3508484   .8210231          0   9.265306
Ratio of Wage Arrears
to Annual Wage Fund       |     263    .2284997   .3487218          0   3.341837
Local unemployment,%      |     263    .0978373    .058447      .0254      .3068
Owner’s dominance
     Manager’s  |     263    .2129278   .4101575          0          1
     outsider’s |     263    .2129278   .4101575          0          1
     insider’s  |     263    .2889734   .4541498          0          1
State influence |     263    .2585551   .4386754          0          1
State Share
g100  |     263    .2357414   .4252706          0          1
g5075 |     263    .0228137   .1495938          0          1
zol   |     263     .026616   .1612651          0          1
State Support
     Gos        |     263    .1901141   .3931391          0          1
     monopolist |     263     .095057   .2938529          0          1
Trade union’s activity
        un |     263     .513308   .5007758          0          1
   dogovor |     263    .4676806   .4999057          0          1
Enterprise’s sector of industry
     ot1 |     263     .026616   .1612651          0          1
     ot2 |     263    .0494297   .2171767          0          1
     ot3 |     263    .0190114   .1368253          0          1
     ot4 |     263    .3041825   .4609375          0          1
     ot5 |     263    .0608365   .2394859          0          1
     ot6 |     263    .1558935    .363446          0          1
     ot7 |     263    .0912548   .2885201          0          1
     ot8 |     263    .1901141   .3931391          0          1
     ot9 |     263    .0038023   .0616626          0          1
    ot10 |     263    .0152091   .1226172          0          1
    ot11 |     263    .0152091   .1226172          0          1
    ot12 |     263    .0494297   .2171767          0          1
    ot13 |     263    .0190114   .1368253          0          1
 Enterprise’s Location
    reg1 |     263    .1444867   .3522529          0          1
    reg2 |     263    .1140684   .3185005          0          1
    reg3 |     263    .0874525   .2830356          0          1
    reg4 |     263    .0722433    .259384          0          1
     reg |     263     .581749   .4942123          0          1
Number of enterprises 263
1998
Variable                  |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max
--------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------
Sales (Th.Rb.)            |     258    46757.03   220333.1          7    3397713
Labor (No.Employees)      |     258    471.3178   960.7492          4      13028
 Av.Monthly Wage, Rb.     |     258    .9081026   .4934151          0   3.419531
Ratio of Receivables
to Sales                  |     258    .7839772   3.654712          0   53.14286
Ratio of Wage Arrears
to Annual Wage Fund       |     258    .4251157   2.345396          0   37.20513
Local unemployment,%      |     258    .1724663   .0648383      .0331      .3403
Owner’s dominance
     Manager’s  |     258    .2286822   .4208004          0          1
     outsider’s |     258    .2054264   .4047981          0          1
     insider’s  |     258    .2790698   .4494137          0          1
State influence |     258    .2596899   .4393167          0          1
State Share
g100  |     258    .2364341   .4257176          0          1
g5075 |     258    .0232558   .1510078          0          1
zol   |     258    .0271318   .1627832          0          1
State Support
     Gos        |     258    .1937984   .3960411          0          1
     monopolist |     258    .1007752   .3016159          0          1
Trade union’s activity
        un |     258    .5193798   .5005954          0          1
   dogovor |     258    .4767442   .5004296          0          1
Enterprise’s sector of industry
     ot1 |     258    .0232558   .1510078          0          1
     ot2 |     258    .0503876   .2191686          0          1
     ot3 |     258    .0193798   .1381239          0          1
     ot4 |     258    .3100775   .4634241          0          1
     ot5 |     258    .0581395   .2344619          0          1
     ot6 |     258    .1472868   .3550804          0          1
     ot7 |     258    .0930233   .2910296          0          1
     ot8 |     258    .1937984   .3960411          0          1
     ot9 |     258     .003876   .0622573          0          1
    ot10 |     258    .0155039   .1237857          0          1
    ot11 |     258    .0155039   .1237857          0          1
    ot12 |     258    .0503876   .2191686          0          1
    ot13 |     258    .0193798   .1381239          0          1
 Enterprise’s Location
    reg1 |     258    .1472868   .3550804          0          1
    reg2 |     258    .1124031   .3164757          0          1
    reg3 |     258    .0930233   .2910296          0          1
    reg4 |     258    .0736434   .2616974          0          1
     reg |     258    .5736434   .4955081          0          1
Number of enterprises 263
Table C2.
Share of the sample in large-sized and average-sized enterprises of Novosibirsk region industry, %
Share in the number of enterprises Share in sales Share in employment
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 94,35 89,80 88,52 75,20 67,76 63,25 74,94 65,55 79,69 77,59 77,80 79,07 74,15 76,89 76,87 70,78 72,46 72,25
Fuel and energetic industry 88,89 87,5 80 77,78 63,64 66,67 95,72 97,41 97,03 99,01 99,32 99,24 97,05 99,25 99,38 97,53 98,33 98,39
Coal iron and steel industry 90 90,91 81,25 92,86 100 92,86 46,4 89,50 92,79 79,48 100,0 99,89 52,91 99,72 94,86 87,48 99,79 99,75
Chemical and petrochemical
industry
75,00 85,71 85,71 83,33 83,33 71,43 62,81 87,50 96,41 98,90 99,18 99,22 49,17 99,16 96,96 99,34 99,42 99,35
Engineering industry 88,89 87,27 76,43 67,94 65,35 63,36 69,95 39,27 45,73 44,48 45,29 47,43 64,91 61,41 61,49 50,45 52,14 50,30
Woodworker and cellulose
industry
54,76 88,00 85,19 94,74 64,00 60,00 85,62 98,78 99,56 95,06 94,63 86,88 82,59 95,56 94,01 91,44 92,67 88,62
Industry of construction
materials
95,56 93,48 85,19 85,42 85,42 75,00 69,26 91,63 98,21 95,23 95,41 93,72 90,85 97,17 99,23 94,40 94,87 93,38
Light industry 76,19 78,57 89,74 70,00 49,09 55,10 82,54 83,66 88,99 84,72 91,02 91,88 93,15 96,92 75,75 85,12 89,96 91,73
Food proceeding industry 95,41 92,86 96,30 69,44 76,92 65,79 96,04 93,20 98,65 91,95 87,53 86,65 99,62 98,23 91,73 87,49 84,69 89,11
Microbiological industry 50,00 50,00 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 69,64 54,79 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 67,11 68,24 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Milling and grain industry 72,73 66,67 72,73 66,67 57,14 57,14 74,56 93,65 88,17 73,11 77,69 76,51 80,03 78,57 87,88 55,17 55,52 52,95
Medical industry 66,67 75,00 57,14 66,67 57,14 50,00 93,27 82,25 57,27 55,70 86,68 60,67 57,23 58,94 72,82 79,68 91,29 81,04
Publishing and printing
industry 86,67 66,67 46,15 92,31 76,47 56,52 86,53 88,22 96,53 97,52 94,83 94,45 97,81 98,89 93,42 95,14 2,61 92,03
Other 60 71,43 83,33 71,43 33,33 29,41 78,13 85,97 37,47 68,24 64,09 44,61 95,69 86,10 37,78 96,84 79,88 56,99
Table С3
Simultaneous Employment Equation and Wage Equation
(OLS Estimates for Unbalanced Panel of Firms) (standard errors are in parentheses)
Employment Equation Wage Equation
Variable Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms Variable Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
1994-1996 1997-1998 1994-1996 1997-1998 1994-1996 1997-1998 1994-1996 1997-1998
lnqt .708 *  (.014) .658*   (.017) .682* (.017) .647*   (.019) lnwaget-1 .369*   (.029) .494* (.033) .325*   (.039) .456* (.039)
lnwaget -.984* (.036) -.857*  (.038) -.918*  (.042) -.786*  (.038) lnql t .518*   (.019) .488* (.033) .558*   (.025) .545* (.039)
lnawaget -.032  (.045) -.007   (.047) -.011   (.051) .013  (.047) lnqlt-1 -.111*  (.021) -.180*(.036) -.103*  (.027) -.190*(.042)
σ 1.016* (.038) .864* (.047) .929* (.044) .773* (.049) LREwage .646* (.022) .609* (.030) .674* (.023) .653* (.036)
ξ -.032       (.044) -.009   (.057) .012 (.055) -.017 (.062) Mon -.007   (.042) -.015  (.051) -.0003    (.053) -.014 (.059)
K .022   (.088) -.030*  (.011) -.101   (.088) .088 (.053) M .024   (.020) .013**(.006) .137** (.054) .012**(.006)
P1-P7 Yes Yes Yes Yes Unempl .407***(.220) -.032   (.277) .623***(.346) .007 (.337)
Un .165*   (.038) .208*   (.047) .220*   (.043) .231*   (.048) Un .027   (.028) .039   (.035) .039   (.037) .047 (.042)
Svpr .019   (.041) .031   (.051) .051   (.048) .059   (.052) Svpr -.043   (.030) -.013   (.039) .003   (.041) -.002  (.046)
Gos .226*   (.049) .180*  (.058) .206*   (.053) .155*   (.057) Gos -.031   (.036) -.055   (.043) -.030   (.045) -.050  (.050)
G100 .519* (.071) .248*** (.127) -.266  (.250) -.169  (.193) G100 .252*  (.056) .175***
(.097)
.057   (.219) .017 (.167)
G50-75 -.610*   (.127) -.128 (.152) -.896*  (.132) -.364**(.151) G50-75 -.244**  (.096) .135   (.115) -.345*  (.117) .054  (.134)
Zol .035   (.106) -.044 (.130) -.120   (.119) .063   (.138) Zol -.021  (.080) .064   (.099) -.028  (.103) .181 (.122)
Man -.271*   (.059) -.265*  (.073) -.250*  (.065) -.235*  (.075) Man -.058   (.044) -.010   (.055) -.043  (.056) .004 (.066)
Out .148**   (.074) .149   (.092) .264*   (.080) .241** (.095) Out -.102***(.055) -.049   (.068) -.064   (.067) -.053    (.081)
V1 .142**   (.064) .064 (.076) .161** (.071) .032   (.076) V1 .082***  (.048) .055   (.058) .142** (.060) .075  (.066)
V3 -.394** (.155) -.391**(.178) -.520*  (.147) -.474* (.166) V3 .144    (.115) .114    (.130) .094  (.123) .129  (.140)
V4 -.080 (.057) -.112 (.072) -.023   (.058) -.077  (.072) V4 .043   (.042) .056    (.054) .065   (.049) .078  (.063)
Constant -2.613*   (.280) -1.787*  (.306) -1.662*(.402) -1.261*(.354) Constant -1.658*   (.096) -1.292*(.131) -1.558*(.245) -1.229* (.191)
Reg – reg4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
Observ.
873 465 534 357 873 465 534 357
Tests F=264.92
Prob>F=0.00
F=163.21
Prob>F=0.00
F= 179.84
Prob>F=0.00
F=140.81
Prob>F=0.00
Tests F=127.67
Prob>F= 0.00
F=97.45
Prob>F= 0.00
F=79.87
Prob>F=0.00
F=70.98
Prob>F=0.00
R2 0.8300 0.8556 0.8510 0.8724 R2 0.7719 0.8375 0.7817 0.8320
* - significant at test level 1%;   ** - significant at test level 5%;    *** - significant at test level 10%.
Table C4
Labor Demand Model: OLS of Basic Employment Equation and Augmented Employment Equation
1992-1993
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt
(standard errors are in parentheses)
Variable Basic Employment Equation Augmented Employment Equation
Unbalanced
Panels of Firms
Balanced Panel of
Firms
Unbalanced Panels
of Firms
Balanced Panel of
Firms
lnLt-1 .919* (.021) .906*  (.026) .918*   (.022) .897*  (.028)
lnqt .057* (.019) .032  (.022) .057*  (.019) .033  (.022)
lnqt-1 .001  (.019) .027  (.020) .001  (.019) .026   (.020)
LREq .718* (.138) .629* (.137) .708* (.158) .567* (.134)
lnwaget .024  (.040) .038  (.051) .010  (.041) .027  (.052)
lnwaget-1 .085* (.026) .052***  (.030) .086*  (.026) .052***  (.030)
LREwage 1.345***(.723) .957 (.710) 1.169*** (.696) .769 (.626)
Unemplt .133  (.328) .280   (.465)
Assets91 .00007   (.0001) .0002  (.0001)
Constanta .280*** (.159) .238   (.174) .320   (.207)
Test F=  546.97
Prob > F =0.00
F =  420.31
Prob > F =0.00
F=  469.37
Prob > F  =  0.00
F =  382.55
Prob > F =0.00
Adj R2 0.9831 0.9846 0.9823 0.9845
Observations 207 139 203 139
Table C5
Effective bargaining model:  OLS Estimates of Employment Equation 1992-1993
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees, lnLt
(standard errors are in parentheses)
Variable Unbalanced Panels  of Firms Balanced Panels  of Firms
lnqt .552*  (.032) .521*   (.042)
lnwaget -.774* (.103) -.685* (.145)
lnawaget .723*   (.189) .789*  (.280)
σ .051 (.209) -.103 (.318)
ξ -14.247 (61.96) 7.651 (21.245)
Constant -3.439*  (.879) -3.106**  (1.272)
Tests F =   64.19 Prob > F      =  0.000 F =   41.41 Prob > F      =  0.000
Adj R2 0.8049 0.8146
Observations 246 139
Table C6
OLS Estimates of Wage Equation  1992-1993
Dependent Variable is the Logarithm of Average Monthly Wage, lnWaget
(standard errors are in parentheses)
Variable Unbalanced Panels of Firms Balanced Panel of Firms
LnWaget-1 .232*   (.044) .183*  (.051)
Lnql t .235*   (.034) .223*   (.042)
Lnqlt-1 -.019  (.035) .009  (.039)
LREwage .281* (.032) .283* (.036)
Constant -2.102*   (.146) -2.268*   (.170)
Tests F =   10.33 Prob > F      =  0.00 F =    7.70 Prob > F      =  0.0000
Adj R2 0.4991 0.5049
Observations 207 139
* - significant at test level 1%;
** - significant at test level 5%;
*** - significant at test level 10%.
Table C7
Estimating the impact of ownership on labor contract (dogovor) singing
Estimating the impact of ownership on state support obtaining
Probit estimates (unbalanced panels of firms)
Independent Dependent variables
variables Dogovor State support
1994-1996 1997-1998 1994-1996 1997-1998
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z|
State ownership .359 .120 .423 .139 -.604 .134 -.545 .232
Outsider’s
ownership
-.287 .228 -.246 .413 .354 .364 .355 .436
Manager’s
ownership
-.576* .006 -.267 .221 -1.559** .028 -.567 .204
Log Likelihood -235.032 -159.599 -75.205 -52.475
Tests chi2(2)  =  249.19
Prob>chi2= 0.00
chi2(2) = 163.05
Prob > chi2  = 0.00
chi2(2)       =  151.78
Prob > chi2   = 0.00
chi2(2)     =  97.42
Prob> chi2   = 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.347 0.338 0.502 0.481
Observations 519 348 218 146
* - significant at test level 1%;
** - significant at test level 5%;
*** - significant at test level 10%.
Note: Covariate includes region dummies (Reg - Reg4), 12 industry dummies and 4 employment size
dummies. The omitted categories are as follows: Ot7 - for the group of sectors, Reg - for region
dummies, s1 - for size dummies, Ins - for ownership dummies. See Appendix A for precise definitions.
Appendix D
Calculation of Coefficient ψ
According to existing legislation any individual who have at least one year of service is provided for
unemployment benefit equal to 75 percent of his or her average annual wage on the previous work
during the first three months of unemployment period, for the next four months of being unemployed
the amount of unemployment benefits is equal to 60 percent average of annual wage and finally for the
last five months of the year it make up 45 percent of average annual wage. We assume that one year of
service criterion has been met.
Based on this approach, the share of average annual wage which is guaranteed as an
unemployment benefit is equal to:
ψ  = (3/12)*0.75+(4/12)*0.6 + (5/12)*0.45 = 0.575;
But this is true only if there is no any delay in paying off the unemployment benefits.
 The share of average annual wage which individual gets as unemployment benefit during the year
reduces as a result of delay of payments. The following correction of the coefficient ψ  was used in
order to take into account the existence of delay of payments of unemployment benefits.
Table D1.
Time period of delay of payments of
unemployment benefits, in months Coefficient ψ
12 0
11 0.0625
10 0.125
9 0.1875
8 0.2375
7 0.2875
6 0.3375
5 0.3875
4 0.425
3 0.4625
2 0.5
1 0.5375
0 0.575
